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This thesis seeks to contemplate the nature of active participation today in the 
context of social media. Social media, exemplified by platforms such as Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, etc., as the interface of the technology that produces the ‘social’, is 
increasingly seen as a site of resistance, allowing for new subjectivities as well as a 
space for challenging dominant ideologies or systems of power. While participation in 
general has traditionally been seen as a form of resistance and the enactment of 
agency, particularly in the domain of politics and art, I argue that within social media, 
the antithesis is also true, for active participation amongst its users, because of the 
cybernetic form of participation, is performing the exact opposite function, by 
symbolically ‘killing off’ representation and denying resistance to its very users.  
Participation in social media, I argue, has also become voluntarily ‘obscene’ in the 
Baudrillardian sense, encouraged by the technical forms of mediated participation 
such as the ‘like’ or ‘share’ button, resulting in the generation of an over-excess of 
information as well as a capacity to obliterate difference as noise. This combined 
effect and interplay of cybernetic simulation and obscenity of active participation in 
the age of social media culminates in what Baudrillard termed the ‘Perfect Crime’. 
Social media, I conclude, therefore embodies the perfect crime, for reality gets 







Chapter One: Blinded by the Media 
 
The revolution would surely be tweeted. This statement, when left by itself, 
without a context, seems to lend its support to popular Internet intellectuals who argue 
that we are on the brink of a social media revolution1.  At the same time, this appears 
to directly oppose Malcolm Gladwell’s claim in The New Yorker that the revolution 
would not be tweeted2. 
 
Consider this scenario then, there is a terrorist attack in a shopping mall in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and the terrorists have taken hostages in a violent three day shoot-out 
with the Kenyan police that killed more than 60 people. To counter the threat of 
terrorism and assuage the fear of the Kenyan public, the Kenyan police started ‘live-
tweeting’ the hostage scenario in real-time (Abad-Santos, n. pag.)3. One of their 
tweets read: “We have taken control of all the floors. We're not here to feed the 
attackers with pastries but to finish and punish them4.” Or consider the next scenario - 
The Boston Marathon held on 15 April, 2013, where two homemade bombs exploded, 
killing three people and injuring 264 others (Kotz, n. pag.). On 1 May, 2013, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See for instance Shirkey, Clay. “The Political Power of Social Media”. Foreign 




2 See Gladwell, Malcom. “Why the revolution will not be tweeted”. The New Yorker. 




4 See https://twitter.com/PoliceKE/status/382161864106737664 !
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Boston Police Department announced via Twitter that three new suspects had been 
placed under arrest in the Boston Marathon bombing case5. In both scenarios, we see 
the same thing: a ‘reality’ that unfolds before our screen via new media technologies. 
 
When the first sentence, ‘The Revolution would surely be tweeted’ is taken 
out of context, we see that it immediately veers strongly to one side of the big debate 
over how social media can be ‘used’. However, when we place it back into the 
context of the next paragraph, we then realize that it neither affirms nor denies either 
side. Therein lies its significance. The fact that it can be taken out of context and 
immediately slot into an on-going polemic about social media suggests that it is 
ideological in the first instance. This is what Slavoj Žižek might call ideology at its 
purest, for when we focus on one single point, the very ‘use’ of the sentence, we 
relegate its entire context and everything else to the horizon. But what then, is so 
ideological about that? 
  
The hype that surrounded the rise of social media seems to have died down a 
little, compared to the initial phase when it was gaining popularity. In the early stages 
of ‘social media’ technologies such as Facebook and Twitter, there were widespread 
claims of the ‘democratizing’ potential of these new media platforms, particularly 
harped in popular Western liberal discourses. The immediate emphasis was on how 
these technologies have been used to achieve democracy. When ten thousand people 
protested in the street against their communist government in Moldova, it was dubbed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See https://twitter.com/bostonpolice/status/329612972521558016 !
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the Twitter revolution because of the way Twitter allowed for the social organizing of 
the protesters6. In Iran, when students threatened to protest against its authoritarian 
state, the U.S State Department requested for Twitter to postpone their scheduled 
maintenance for they didn’t want a “critical organizing tool out of service at the 
height of the demonstrations”. During this period, there were even calls for Twitter to 
be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.   
 
When a fresher and newer wave of protests termed the Arab Spring broke out 
from Tunisia to Egypt, the claims grew ever louder. The term Twitter Revolution 
proceeded to cover not only the protests in Moldova, but also in Iran, Tunisia and 
Egypt. Once the focus of the news coverage shifted to the teleological outcome of the 
demonstrations and such ‘revolutions’ became labeled as ‘successful’, for instance in 
the case of the overthrowing of former President Zine El Abindine Ben Ali in the 
Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the claims of the power of social media became 
ecstatic.  
 
For the protestors, the Arab Spring revolutions were the best exemplification 
of how social media such as Facebook and Twitter empowered common people to 
eradicate unjustness and overthrow authoritarian dictators. Yet two years on, after two 
overthrown dictators in Egypt, first Hosni Mubarak then Mohamed Morsi, both by the 
military, there is still no clear end to the civil conflict that surrounds Egypt. Is there !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Hodge, Nathan. “Inside Moldova’s Twitter Revolution” Wired. 4 Aug. 2009. 




just too much injustice, or too little empowerment? Or perhaps, are more social media 
tools needed? 
 
The polemic on the social media revolution was not all one-sided. Critics such 
as Evgeny Morozov and Malcom Gladwell argued against such simplistic views of 
new media technologies. Morozov, in particular was a strong vocal opponent of such 
cyber-utopianism. In The Net Delusion, he argues that the hype surrounding the 
polemic was developed mostly because of uninformed views and a group of uncritical 
and cyber-utopianistic journalists. He outlines a key difference between cyber-
utopianism and internet-centricism, and highlights internet-centricism as a far more 
dangerous ideology. To him, cyber utopianism is a mere flawed set of assumptions, 
while internet-centricism is the methodology that acts upon it. According to Morozov, 
when internet-centricism is pushed to the extreme, it “leads to hubris, arrogance, and a 
false sense of confidence” (Morozov, 16). He points out that Internet-centric policy 
makers have an illusory belief of a full and complete mastery over technological tools 
such as the Internet and social media and tend to assume that new media technologies 
directly shape the social environment thereby disregarding the possibility of other 
uses of technology.  
 
Though I mostly agree with Morozov’s critique of cyber-utopianism and 
Internet-centricism and think that it is a valid critique, I would argue that the problem 
lies far deeper than that, and is not restricted to cyber-utopianism nor Internet-
centricism. In fact, I would extend Morozov’s argument by arguing that even his 
critique is problematic as well since his entire critique rests upon his 
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conceptualization of new media technologies as ‘tools’ to be used. His instrumentalist 
arguments stem from demonstrating how new media technology such as the Internet 
and social media can be used not only for good, but oppressive and authoritarian 
governments are also capable of using such tools for more oppression, such as in the 
case of such as Iran and Venezuela. Thus, he repeats a certain ideological claim of 
social media, that they are somewhat neutral tools. 
 
As influential philosopher Martin Heidegger points out in The Question 
Concerning Technology, when we conceive of technology as a mere neutral tool, 
though or perhaps even because it is so “uncannily correct”, “we are delivered over to 
it in the worst possible way” (288). For Heidegger, the instrumental view of 
technology conceals more than it reveals. In the same way, by conceptualising new 
media technology as mere tools, we are imposing a specific means of looking at new 
media technology that limits and completely disregards and erases other possibilities 
of thinking about new media technologies and their effects. In the case of the popular 
discourses surrounding social media, by focusing on the ‘better’ or ‘worse’ ways in 
which social media technologies, defined as neutral tools, can be used, we remain 
oblivious to the larger problem, that is the implications of the effects of social media 
on society. 
 
Before the term social media was coined, there already existed various terms 
in media scholarship including ‘alternative media’ and ‘radical media’ that explored 
the connection between minority groups and how their use of such media technologies 
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challenged dominant hierarchies and power7. As Morozov notes, all forms of 
technology have always had an accompanying techno-utopianistic discourse, from the 
invention of the telegraph to the airplane, radio and television (276). Media 
technologies always had an empowering aspect to them, because of the way they 
seem to transform the world into a ‘global village’ through transmitting more 
information about the world thereby removing “causes of misunderstanding” and 
extending knowledge about the world (ibid). Both the radio and television were 
expected to radically transform politics and usher in a new era of public participation 
and create a whole new democratic world (281).  
 
The television medium, at the point where it was still considered a new 
medium, was also seen as having the “potential to contribute to a more informed, 
inclusive, and nonpartisan democracy” (Gurevitch, Coleman & Blumler, 164). Then, 
Groombridge argued for television to be a vehicle for participatory democracy, even 
suggesting that television “be considered as candidate for a major part in the civilising 
of our arid communal existence and in the improvement and enlivenment of our 
democracy, such that more people have the opportunity, the aptitude, the incentive, 
and the desire to play an active personal part in what is with unconscious irony called 
‘public life’” (Groombridge, 25). In short, the assumption was that newer media 
technologies such as the television enable more communication, which effectively 
contributes to ‘better’ communication.    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See for instance (Atton, 2002, 2004; Couldry & Curran, 2003) for alternative media 
and (Downing, 2001) for radical media. 
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From these popular discourses and various studies on online media, we can 
tease out another implicit assumption: the assumption that those who are oppressed 
and marginalized formerly had little or no means of communication. As such newer 
forms of media, for instance social media, afford them a special form of 
communication that therefore allows their voices to be heard. Thus, seen in this 
direction, we can only conclude that with more communication and more tools for and 
of communication, it would only be better for society in general. Following this, one 
misassumption that we could immediately draw out from the underlying over-
optimistic narratives surrounding new media technologies is that increased 
information flow is seen as equal to increased and better communication. A more 
critical reading of this phenomenon instead, might be that such narratives are so 
popular precisely because it ideologically restructures and reduces accounts of 
complicated, overdetermined and difficult-to-digest techno-social situations into 
simplistic and determinist analyses that offer a more comprehensible story for mass 
consumer audiences – in other words, an account that can be easily used.  
 
The above simplistic conclusion of course would not only largely ignore the 
fact that newer forms of media problematizes communication, not only in the way net 
critics like Morozov described in its negative uses, but also masks the point that 
perhaps communication was always problematic to begin with. Such a conclusion, 
upon closer examination, would also reveal the presupposition of a certain 
rationalistic and linear model of communication, i.e. that communication only 




The critique of the instrumentalist view of new technology is neither new nor 
recent. Besides Heidegger, who was more concerned about the ontological nature of 
technology, Marshall McLuhan already specifically warned us nearly fifty years ago 
that we risk being blinded by what the media can do, when we look at its uses instead 
of the impacts on ‘human affairs’ and such an instrumentalist outlook is the “numb 
stance of the technological idiot” (McLuhan, 8).  
 
While Morozov and most other net critics and optimists may have unwittingly 
fallen into this category of the ‘technological idiot’, this is not to say, however that the 
entire field of media studies have primarily been over-optimistic with over-emphasis 
on the ‘uses’ of technology. It is indeed interesting and no doubt necessary to explore 
the ways in which minority and oppressed groups adopt and utilize new media 
technologies to challenge and renegotiate their struggles with dominant ideologies, 
systems of power, hierarchy or the state. The main reason why they are able to do so 
is because new media technologies increasingly allow a space for minority groups to 
perform what Faye Ginsberg terms ‘cultural activism’, where minority groups can re-
engage with power structures that have marginalized them (Ginsberg, 139). Yet, it is 
also contentious to see media technologies like the Internet as a mere platform for 
resistance and counter hegemonic expression since it can still perpetuate the interests 
of dominant economic and political powers.  
 
As Nicholas Gane points out, there is a tendency in cultural studies literature 
to analyze new media technologies in isolation from the general structural dynamics 
of capitalist culture, thereby arguing for the need to consider digital technology within 
!!
9!
the context of capitalist culture (Gane, 431). Gane therefore argues, through the 
elaboration of Lyotard’s theories, that the computerization of society encourages the 
commodification of knowledge, and also speeds up or rationalizes capitalist culture 
through the mechanistic reduction of knowledge to information, and information to 
processable bits or bytes. This point has also been taken up by scholars such as Jodi 
Dean, where she argues that networked communicative technologies under the effect 
of ‘communicative capitalism’ are ‘profoundly’ depoliticizing. Drawing upon the 
work of Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek, she explains that communicative 
exchanges, rather than being intrinsic to democratic politics, are currently the “basic 
elements of capitalist production” (56)8. Thus, as a result, participation in new media, 
rather than allowing for true social change, forecloses politics instead. Ingrid Hoofd 
further builds on her argument by demonstrating how certain forms of activism are 
not oppositional to, but rather complicit in the processes of neoliberal globalization 
through the acceleration and intensification of techno-capitalism. By reversing Dean’s 
proposition, she argues that such technologies instead of foreclosing politics, 
repoliticises technologies through the reproduction of the ideologies of what she terms 
“speed-elitism”9.  
 
One reason why new media technologies are so seductive and used not just by 
minority groups but almost everyone nowadays, I argue, is connected to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative 
Capitalism and Left Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 2009. Print  
 
9 For her full argument, please see Chapter 1, Complicities of Resistance, Ingrid 
Hoofd, Ambiguities of Activism. Alter-globalist and the Imperatives of Speed. New 
York: Routledge. 2012. Print!
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fundamental way such new media technologies increasingly replicate and mimic the 
environment of a ‘real’ community. Thus, through simulation, such technologies 
afford a ‘realistic’ and ‘real-time’ space for communication across spatial and 
temporal boundaries. However, one alarming process that is commonly neglected is 
the mediation process itself. If the medium, as McLuhan claims, is really the message, 
then what exactly does the message say? The question concerning new media 
technologies, thus as I interpret it, is then: what are the implications of such forms of 
simulation that takes place within new media technologies today?  
 
Hence, it is from this perspective that I wish to proceed to question and 
analyze the medium that is social media. Rather than looking at the “uses” of social 
media, I diverge from the instrumentalist view to explore the implications of a reality 
that is increasingly simulated and mediated in the digital sphere. This thesis will also 
seek to engage with the works of Heidegger and draw heavily upon the theories of 
media philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who remains largely neglected outside the field 
of continental philosophy, despite the sheer relevance and importance of his work, 
particularly to the field of media studies today.  
 
In this thesis, I will begin by examining the modern thinking that drives 
technology today and what modern technology represents in the age of social media. 
Following this, I will analyze some of the assumptions that pervade social media, 
such as the transition from being a consumer to a producer. With the aid of 
Baudrillard’s theories, I will argue that participation in the age of social media has 
become ‘obscene’ in Baudrillardian terms, precisely because of the process of 
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simulation that is the epitome of the digital age. This ultimately results in participation 
becoming a symbolic murderer of not only reality, but also representation and 
resistance as well, thus embodying what Baudrillard called ‘The Perfect Crime’.     
 
1.1 The Dominance of Technological thinking 
It is important to state on the onset that Heidegger was not against technology 
per se, but rather he highlighted the dangers of technological forms of thinking. We 
can see this most clearly when he strongly criticized the new fundamental science for 
its cybernetic quality in The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking. He says: 
 
For it is the theory of the steering of the possible planning and arrangement of 
human labour. Cybernetics transforms language into an exchange of news. 
The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information…Philosophy 
is ending in the present age. It has found its place in the scientific attitude of 
socially active humanity. But the fundamental characteristic of this scientific 
attitude is its cybernetic, that is, technological character… Theory means now 
supposition of the categories, which are allowed only a cybernetical function, 
but denied any ontological meaning. The operational and model character of 
representation-calculative thinking becomes dominant. (Heidegger, 376-377, 
italics mine) 
 
For Heidegger, cybernetics is a technological form of thinking, which modern 
science characterizes and it shapes how we think and the way we see the world, as 
such he argues that this form of rationalistic, calculative thinking effectively 
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forecloses philosophy. In addition, he argues that such techno-scientific thinking 
sustains its own justification through its ever-impressive results, in this instrumental 
pattern, which was ironically in the first place formalized through its own 
rationalizing and judging criteria. Yet, despite its ‘correctness’, it says nothing about 
the “what first grants the possibility of the rational and the irrational” (Heidegger, 
391). Thus, Heidegger suggests that cybernetics only represents what is present and 
correct but not necessarily what is true. Heidegger instead yearns for a thinking that 
goes beyond the binary of rationality and irrationality, because the cybernetic form of 
thinking, according to him, is severely limiting. Though Heidegger himself is also 
open to critique, for while performing the critique of cybernetics, he also romanticizes 
and mobilizes language as his technology or technè, this does not diminish the 
validity of his criticism of cybernetics. 
 
The term ‘cybernetic’ itself was first made popular by Norbert Wiener, who 
unified the field of control and communication theory, and defined it with the same 
title as his book: as the study of control and communication in the animal and the 
machine. The study of messages, in particular the “effective messages of control”, as 
well as notions of feedback were central to cybernetics (8). Wiener, who was a 
mathematician by training, defines the message as a “discrete or continuous sequence 
of measurable events distributed in time – precisely what is called a time-series by the 
statisticians” (16). Cybernetics is concerned with efficiency and effectiveness, and 
thus seeks to control and optimize systems in order to accurately predict and 
manipulate outcomes. The well-known Shannon and Weaver model of 
communication, which proposes that communication can be reduced to a process of 
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transmitting information between a sender and receiver, from a source to the 
destination, is one such example.  
 
The problem arises when cybernetics assumes all forms of communication, 
not just between systems, but including communication among humans and animals, 
can be reduced to mechanistic pieces of information, then coded within Boolean logic 
to the binaries of 1 and 0 into systems. As Wiener explicates: “whatever means of 
communication the race may have (whether animal or humans), it is possible to define 
and to measure the amount of information to the race, and to distinguish it from the 
amount of information available to the individual” (183). This form of reductionist 
logic is inevitable within the field of cybernetics and is necessary to perform, so that 
communication can be determinable, and therefore calculated for effective use. 
Wiener remarks: 
 
“The telegraph and the telephone can perform their function only if the 
messages they transmit are continually varied in a manner not completely 
determined by their past, and can only be designed effectively if the variation 
of these messages conforms to some sort of statistical regularity. (18) 
 
Such a functionalist outlook and technological form of thinking was criticized 
by Heidegger as dangerous, for it enframes the subject and induces a form of thinking 
that relegates nature as “standing-reserve”, into an objective resource for 
management, utilization and therefore opening up the possibility for exploitation 
(308). It would not be too far-fetched to claim that such an ideology is still being 
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perpetuated by modern technology today. It is also particularly contentious, taking 
into consideration the Kuhnian perspective that all data and experiments are still 
subject to interpretation10. Cybernetics seemed to postulate that interpretation is no 
longer necessary, for it dehumanizes communications and instead looks at 
communication in the form of synthetic objects. While Wiener acknowledges to a 
certain extent, though somewhat reluctantly, that cybernetics may not be able to fully 
account for processes in the social sciences when he concludes that “there is much 
which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the unscientific, narrative method 
of the professional historian. (191)”, it is merely because he acknowledges that it 
might be not yet be possible for communication in the social sciences to be 
homeostatic in some instances, homeostasis being one of the assumptions of 
cybernetics.  
 
Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger’s former student, later elaborated on the work of 
Heidegger by diverging from phenomenology and incorporating a Hegelian-Marxist 
dialectic instead. He examines the impact of such forms of technological thinking on 
society, and makes the argument, in Some Social Implications of Modern Technology, 
that individualistic rationality in his time has been socially conditioned and 
transformed into technological rationality, under the technological power of the 
apparatus (Marcuse, 141). For Marcuse, at the very first instance, technology 
constitutes a mode of domination and control. As he says: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Second Edition. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. Print. !
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Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices 
and contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the same time a 
mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a 
manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for 
control and domination. (139) 
 
Marcuse also argues that technological rationality is highly different from previous 
forms of rationality. Technological rationality no longer corresponded to what he 
denotes as natural “human needs and potentialities” (143). Rather, technological 
rationality has become a machinic process, which “appears as the embodiment of 
rationality and expediency” (ibid).   
 
Marcuse, gives an elaborate but striking example of how technological rationality, 
with its principles of standardized efficiency, subordinates the freedom of the 
individual:  
 
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses his route from the 
highway maps. Towns, lakes and mountains appear as obstacles to be 
bypassed. The countryside is shaped and organized by the highway. Numerous 
signs and posters tell the traveller what to do and think; they even request his 
attention to the beauties of nature or the hallmarks of history. Others have 
done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the better. Convenient parking 
spaces have been constructed where the broadest and most surprising view is 
open. Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the pause that 
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refreshes. And all this is indeed for his benefit. Safety and comfort; he 
receives what he wants. Business, technics, human needs and nature are 
welded together into one rational and expedient mechanism. He will fare best 
who follows its directions, subordinating his spontaneity to the anonymous 
wisdom which ordered everything for him. (Marcuse, 143) 
 
To him, such an example illustrates the technological form of thinking that is so 
perfectly rational and logical in today’s society but simultaneously dehumanizes the 
individual into a subservient and compliant object. All subsequent actions, 
accompanied with this mindset of technological rationality, then become mere 
reactions to already prescribed mechanical norms. Thus, technology is a “rational 
apparatus, combining utmost expediency with utmost convenience, saving time and 
energy, removing waste, adapting all means to the end, anticipating consequences, 
sustaining calculability and security” (ibid). 
 
To some extent, we see parallels of what he described being realized in 
contemporary societies today. We no longer need to plan our journey anymore, for we 
have our trusty Global Positioning Systems (GPS) that does it for us. Global 
automobile manufacturers are already starting to sell ‘smart’ cars, cars that can drive 
and navigate by itself. At major shopping complexes with parking facilities for 
example, there exists a system of monitoring that uses a combination of red and green 
lights devised to manage the flow of traffic and allow better visibility so that drivers 
can park more quickly and efficiently. In the same way then, we are already so deeply 
entrenched into such an ideology of convenience, where we are so efficient to the 
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point where we are not required to think, that we have outsourced thinking itself to 
technology, and where everything has been calculated and rationalized for us. Social 
media, likewise as a form of technology, has already naturalized this ideology of 
convenience, for it is now easier and more convenient to get news from our social 
media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, in ‘real-time’.  
 
Marcuse also reiterates Heidegger’s point about the close relationship between 
science and technological thinking, when he says in another book, Negations, that: 
 
The democratic abolition of thought, which the ‘common man’ undergoes 
automatically and which he himself carries out (in labor and in the use and 
enjoyment of the apparatus of production and consumption), is brought about 
in ‘higher learning’ by those positivistic and positive trends of philosophy, 
sociology, and psychology that make the established system into an 
insuperable framework for conceptual thought. (Marcuse, xix) 
 
We see this point repeated as well in One Dimensional Man, his critique of society as 
becoming one-dimensional: 
  
The principles of modern science were a priori structured in such a way that 
they could serve as conceptual instruments for a universe of self-propelling, 
productive control; theoretical operationalism came to correspond to practical 
operationalism. The scientific method which led to the ever-more-effective 
domination of nature thus came to provide the pure concepts as well as the 
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instrumentalities for the ever-more-effective domination of man by man 
through the domination of nature… Today, domination perpetuates and 
extends itself not only through technology but as technology…Technological 
rationality thus protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination and 
the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society. 
(116) 
 
Thus, for both Heidegger and Marcuse, technology and cybernetics not only signify a 
way of thinking and a style of practice, but also the (re)structuring of reality as an 
object of technical control. Marcuse takes a far more dystopianistic outlook, 
suggesting that in doing so, technology engenders domination and totalitarianism. 
Within his argument then, he also implicitly criticizes modern science for its illusions 
of neutrality, for it is already politicized through the act of being dominating and 
totalitarian, arguing that science, and by extension, technology therefore is 
ideological.  
 
Lev Manovich extends this argument that technology can be totalitarian when 
he suggests that the phenomenon of computer mediated interactive art is in fact an 
advanced form of audience manipulation, where the “artist uses advanced technology 
to impose his or her totalitarian will on the people” (Manovich, n. pag.) That is why 
for Manovich, he turns to the design aspect of technology by examining at great detail 
the interfaces, applications, simulations, representations and technical content of new 
media. Inspired by the classic Dziga Vertov’s film Man with a Movie Camera, which 
he interprets as a film about the possibilities of film or what he calls the ‘language of 
!!
19!
cinema’, he attempted to construct in a similar vein, a structure of new media that 
relates to the different techniques of representation and simulation, hence the title of 
his book, The Language of New Media (Manovich, xvii). 
 
Manovich analyzes what he terms ‘information culture’, and argues that not 
only individual new media objects, but also the interfaces, both of an operating 
system and of commonly used software applications, also act as representations. By 
organizing data in a certain way and making it possible to access it in a particular 
way, technological representations privilege a particular model of the world and of the 
human subject. Thus, in a sense, Manovich agrees that new media technology allows 
for representations, but these representations are not one that subjects come to form 
themselves, but are instead fixed representations of the designer.  
 
My concerns in this thesis, in this sense, mirror those of Heidegger and 
Marcuse’s, while extending Manovich’s understanding of new media to social media. 
Social media is a product of both cybernetics and modern science and thus reproduces 
certain cybernetic ideologies, including that of technological rationality. In Manovich 
terms then, which system of representation would social media privilege? At the very 
first instance, we are constructed as Internet and social media ‘users’, where we are 
able to ‘control’ what we say, how we look, what we think or almost any part of our 
self-identity, which perhaps can be construed as remnants of cybernetic thought. 
Furthermore, we are even given technical ‘control’ of our privacy online, in 
cyberspace. But even before we consider these different facets of social media, it is 
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necessary to examine in closer detail some of the ideologies in the discourses 

























Chapter Two. From Mass to Social: The Ideology of progress 
 
2.1 Outsmarted by the Machine 
The advent of social media technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, 
Instagram, etc., encompasses this notion of a “new” participatory culture in 
cyberspace. It is often suggested that therein lies the radical nature of social media 
technologies that empowers the common people. Because of its participatory nature, 
every single individual is now ‘empowered’ and has achieved a certain freedom to 
participate in cyberspace. Terms like ‘interactive’, ‘participatory’, and ‘collaborative’, 
have become popular buzzwords and are used in tandem or are closely associated 
with any new media technology. Examples include the collaborative nature of 
Dropbox, the interactive nature of Myspace, and the participatory aspect of social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook . The role of ‘feedback’, which was so 
important to the field of cybernetics, became ever more important even in the field of 
communications. A few questions remain though: is it social media that has allowed 
for us to interact more, or is it social media that is explicitly dictating for us to 
interact? And where does this compulsion to interact stem from?  
 
New forms of culture naturally, as with other previous mediums, have 
emerged from our engagement with digital technologies, from an online sharing 
culture to the phenomenon of digitalization, where everything migrates online and 
becomes visible, to the extent it becomes immortalized in cyber space. A good 
example of this is Google Book’s Library Project that aims to digitalize all books by 
scanning and making searchable the collections of major libraries. Again, this relates 
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to the argument of the ideology of the convenience, and is marked as a sign of 
progress, where everything becomes available in cyberspace, thanks to high-tech 
companies like Google.  
 
In an interesting book titled Smarter than you Think, technology writer Clive 
Thompson proposes that such new technologies like Google and their tools have made 
us smarter than before. While he correctly points out that the use of technological 
tools profoundly shapes our thinking and the way we act, he concludes that the use of 
such technological tools actually significantly augments our abilities, thereby making 
us ‘radically’ smarter in various ways. He gives the example of how Google is able to 
help us remember more, rather than less, by ‘outsourcing’ our memory to our 
technological tools, in what he terms a cure for the “tip-of-the-tongue syndrome” (99-
100). For instance, in the past, there were episodic moments when we could not recall 
things like the title of a movie or a song, even though we were close to recalling it. 
Now, according to Thompson, we can overcome this syndrome by simply searching 
on the Internet. This narrow definition of ‘smart’, on appearance seems to contradict 
Heidegger’s claim that cybernetics reduces philosophy to a thinking that ceases to be 
because it conceals more than it reveals (Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking”, 390- 391).  
 
It is curious when Thompson urges us to remember that new technology has 
always been a source of paralyzing resistance and fear, when in today’s context, I 
argue the converse, where new technology gadgets and products are heralded and 
treated as objects of affection and desire, seems to be more true. The craze for the 
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smart phone, which sees extremely long queues form whenever companies like Apple 
or Samsung launch their ‘latest’ smart phone is a perfect example that suggests 
otherwise. Thompson utilizes the example of how even writing, which he defines as 
the “original technology for externalizing information”, evoked fear in Greek 
philosopher Socrates, who saw the advent of writing as dangerous, for it might kill off 
the traditional Greek culture of debate and eliminate the important function of 
memorizing (75, 120). Thus, Thompson frames his argument to suggest that the 
paranoia concerned with new technologies is misguided, for it has been present since 
the time of Socrates, and it has historically been occurring, yet new technology will 
still eventually get adopted.    
 
What Thompson fails to consider then, is how it is precisely because of the 
paranoia he describes, certain technological tools were forced to be rethought, 
redesigned and reshaped into the tools that they are today. Certainly it is cause for 
celebration to know that we have improved our capability for memory but perhaps the 
term ‘smart’ might not be quite an accurate way to describe it, for wouldn’t it be that 
being ‘smart’ in the past is strongly associated to a certain degree of having a good 
memory with the ability to recall without the use of technological tools? Can we even 
say that we can remember more now, even when we are not the ones doing the 
remembering? Is it not a paradox to say that we actually remember more by 
remembering less now? Or would that be the ideological functioning of a cybernetic 
illusion, that dupes us into thinking that such technological tools are essentially 




Even the use of the superlative ‘smart’ can be ideologically challenged. Why 
is it that all of our technological devices are being labeled as ‘smart’? Our phones, 
television, cars, and even fridges and watches are becoming ‘smarter’. It is perhaps no 
coincidence then that ‘smart’ is also an acronym for Self-Monitoring, Analysis, and 
Reporting Technology11, a hardware monitoring system designed to prevent 
technological systems from failing. Originally developed by IBM, this technology 
was developed for IBM mainframe drives to give advanced warning of drive failures 
and was first referred to as Predictive Failure Analysis. But the question is, if a 
problem is already predicted beforehand, in advance of thought, and a solution 
already pre-proposed to the problem, would it still constitute a problem? Is it not mere 
meaninglessness? However, this acronym guides us in understanding how the term 
‘smart’ is being appropriated to be associated with technology. Technology is labeled 
smart because it anticipates, remembers and predicts on our behalf. It is increasingly 
remembering all our daily habits and preferences, synonymous with the utopian 
phenomenon of technology making us radically smarter that Thompson described, so 
that it can used to monitor, analyze and send reports to (of) us so as to predict and 
prevent failures. In this case, is Thompson not confused in his analysis, for it is not us 
that have become smarter, but instead the reverse is true, that our technological tools 
have become smarter than us.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See SanDisk. Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology (S.M.A.R.T.). 





Another acronym commonly associated with the term ‘smart’ is in the field of 
Organizational Management, which involves the use of strategic management tools 
such as goals and objectives. Goals and objectives, from the organizational 
management point of view, have to be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, 
and Time-specific (SMART). Also known as Management by Objectives, this means 
that in an organizational setting, goals and objectives have to be set beforehand and 
for these objectives to be effective, it has to satisfy the above qualities. It is a 
management technique that is used to ensure that employees understand the direction 
and vision of the organization so that employees can align themselves to these goals 
and objectives with the end-goal of pursuing continuous growth. It is only through 
these quantifiable objectives, that the goals of the organization can be fulfilled, for 
every employee understands the vision of these goals and objectives and thus the end 
goal of a smoothly functioning organization can be achieved. To put it differently, for 
organizations to be progressive, they need to be strategic, and one such strategy is the 
use of ‘SMART’ objectives. On appearance, it has absolutely no relevance to 
technological systems, but upon closer inspection, is this not also the cybernetic 
quality of thinking that renders humans as a resource to be optimized, or in 
Heideggerian terms the relegation of humans to standing-reserve?   
 
Yet, while Thompson valiantly declares that our technological tool shapes the 
way we think, again, his focus ultimately is on the teleological outcome of whether 
we have become smarter than before or not. This displays precisely the sort of 
blindness that Heidegger and McLuhan critiqued. For Heidegger, the “essence of 
technology is by no means anything technological” (Heidegger, “Question 
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Concerning Technology”, 4). But, because of Thompson’s problematic 
instrumentalist definition of technology we so lovingly subscribe to, we become 
concerned only with the teleological outcome, for technology is seen as a means to 
the end. While it is of course correct to say we use tools to achieve certain objectives, 
but for Heidegger, this is not entirely true. Moreover, such an instrumental definition 
results in a fantasy of complete control and mastery over these technological tools, for 
we see tools as equipment to be manipulated.  As Heidegger says,  
 
“The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring 
man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our 
manipulating technology in the proper manner as means… The will to mastery 
becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human 
control” (Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology”, 289) 
 
Relating this back to Thompson’s argument, it is then precisely because of his 
underlying premise that assumes we are in control of our technological tools, that 
results in us being unable to see the fundamental differences between modern forms 
of technology and older forms of technology, since they appear as ‘tools’ to be used 
by us. This is why Thompson mistakenly assumes that writing, as a technology, is no 
more different from Google today since his position already obscures the contextual 
differences between the two.   
 
Another point that Thompson also misses out is that through the use of digital 
technologies itself, we are forced to conform and become like cold, calculating 
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machines. In The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard 
reflects on our use of new media technologies and suggests that because of our 
subordination to principles of efficiency, performance and control, we are 
increasingly becoming ‘inhuman’12. For Lyotard, as Gane explicates, “technological 
development is driven not by a desire to emancipate ‘humanity’ but rather by the 
instrumental quest for maximum efficiency and performance in all spheres of life” 
(Gane, 441).  
 
In a passage where Lyotard describes the same phenomenon that Thompson does, he 
says: 
 
Contemporary machines can accomplish operations which used to be called 
mental operations: taking in of data in terms of information, and storing it 
(memorization), regulation of access to the information (what was known as 
‘recall’), calculations of possible effects according to different programmes, 
taking account of variables and choices (strategy). Any piece of data becomes 
useful (exploitable, operational) once it can be translated into information. 
This is just as much the case for so-called sensory data – colours and sounds – 
to the exact extent that their constitutive physical properties have been 
identified. After they have been put into digital form, these items of data can 
be synthesized anywhere and anytime to produce identical chromatic or 
acoustic products (simulacra). They are thereby rendered independent of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Cambridge: Polity. 
Print. 1991.  !
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place and time of their ‘initial’ reception, realizable at a spatial and temporal 
distance: let’s say telegraphable. The whole idea of an ‘initial’ reception, of 
what since Kant has been called an ‘aesthetic’, an empirical or transcendental 
mode whereby the mind is affected by a ‘matter’ which it does not control, 
which happens to it here and now- this whole idea seems completely out of 
date. (Lyotard, 50) 
 
Thus, the phenomenon Lyotard analyzes goes beyond just the fact that machines are 
taking over certain operations that the human mind used to perform or the 
Heideggerian problematic that information is determined according to an instrumental 
principle of ‘use’. The digitalization of data, Lyotard argues, “tears both cultural 
artifacts and sensory experience from their moorings in physical time and space”, 
which he terms as a ‘hegemonic teleculture’ in which everything now takes place at a 
distance (Gane, 442).  
 
Lyotard then takes a materialist stance and questions the possibility of thought 
‘without a body’ as the hegemonic teleculture itself effaces the physical presence of 
the body itself, stating that one of the goals of current techno-scientific research is in 
fact to eliminate the “biological obstacles that the body places in the way of 
communication” (Gane, 443). With the emergence of new media technologies, culture 
no longer needs to be tied to a physical location, but “may be diffused throughout 
communication networks that are virtually free from time-space constraints” (ibid). 
Lyotard concludes that this continued development should not be taken as a sign of 




The penetration of techno-scientific apparatus into the cultural field in no way 
signifies an increase of knowledge, sensibility, tolerance and liberty. 
Reinforcing this apparatus does not liberate the spirit as the Aufklarung 
thought. Experience shows rather the reverse: a new barbarism, illiteracy and 
imporverishment of language, new poverty, merciless remodeling of opinion 
by the media, immiseration of the mind, as Walter Benjamin and Theodor 
Adorno repeatedly stressed. (Lyotard, 63) 
 
It is therefore important to analyze Thompson’s argument in light of the current 
climate of thinking about social media. Social media have perhaps granted us more 
‘freedom’ than before, but what are the conditions and limits of this freedom? These 
effects of liberation are suspect and should be questioned. Thus, the more important 
question to ask, I argue, is not the teleological outcome of whether we are smarter 
after the use of our technological tools, but instead, how has the use of social media 
technologies affected our mode of being in this world?  
 
2.2 The Liberation of Media 
It would appear contradictory then, considering Marcuse’s concept of 
technical rationality, that social media, instead of serving the needs of the capitalist 
state by making us more productive and efficient, is more likely to have a directly 
opposite effect. As we spend an increasing amount of time on social media, it is more 
likely that we end up neglecting our work because we are entrenched in participatory 
activity on social networks such as Facebook and as a result we become unproductive 
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instead. That is why when new media technology such as Facebook and Twitter 
initially became popular, organizations were at a total loss as to how to deal with such 
new media tools. Ban the use of them and risk employees, who frequently use social 
media becoming unhappy at work resulting in a drop in productivity, or allow the use 
of such technologies and then risk employees being too engaged with them and hence 
a drop in productivity as well? It is only after it became clear that capitalists could 
extract some form of value out of the use of social media, then social media became 
no longer just a fad, and the issue of whether the use of social media should be banned 
within a company faded away.  
 
This contradiction however is important and reveals what Marcuse described 
as the ‘internal contradiction’ of our advanced capitalistic society, the irrational 
element in technological rationality (Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 17). Perhaps, 
one could even argue that the issue of using social media in corporations is 
simultaneously irrational and rational, for it is irrational to even allow the use of a tool 
that limits productivity, but also rational to take advantage of a tool that can be used 
to publicize the company at the same time.   
 
Yet, social media does not function as quite the sort of technology that 
Marcuse or Marx himself would imagine, for it does not seem to automate labour, in 
the sense of a steam mill compared to a hand mill, or a factory where machines starts 
to replace labour power. The strange nature of social media then calls into question 
the traditional Marxist definitions of terms such as production, consumption and even 
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alienation. For because of the voluntary nature of social media, can users be alienated 
from the use of social media, or does alienation even exist?  
 
Rey argues that alienation in late capitalism has become increasingly 
concealed because digital prosumers, who produce and consume digital information 
simultaneously, often do not know the full extent of information that they are 
producing. Unlike workers in the physical factory, who were directly aware of their 
objects of labour as well as their separation from these objects, in yet another form of 
blindness at play, digital users are producing information that they are altogether 
unaware of (410). Even though there is no apparent coercion of labour, in the 
traditional Marxist sense of alienation, in the digital economy, it is not because we as 
workers become more free, but rather coercion become unnecessary because “the 
processes of subjection and social normalization yield a subject that desires the very 
things needed by the system” (409).  
 
Whenever we use social media platforms such as Facebook, to ‘like’ a post, or 
update a status, we are already simultaneously producing and consuming information, 
commodifying it in the act of reproducing it for other users to consume. As Rey 
describes, with digital media, “production is increasingly enacted at sites of 
consumption, and consumption is increasingly being made productive” (400). This 
can be clearly seen not only in social media, but also in websites with web 2.0 
features such as comments. Not only are audience expected to consume the news 
articles, but now they are also allowed to ‘produce’ their own comments. As Lovink 
puts it, “audience interaction (in the digital age) is now a given”. (Lovink, 52). Even 
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the most banal activity such as a ‘like’ on social networks is a sign, and a form of 
production from the user, i.e. produced by the user, that sends a message, creates a 
new form of value for marketing companies who survey the users in order to 
understand their preferences. Thus, in using social media, Rey claims, we are both 
consuming and producing, or ‘prosuming’, to borrow Toffler’s term13 (Rey, 400). This 
reversible transition, from consumer to producer is an important distinction in social 
media that will be scrutinized more closely in section 2.4 that delves into the tension 
between Marx and Baudrillard. The next section will first examine social media in 
closer detail, through a historical analysis, to question the assumption that social 
media is as new and revolutionary as popular discourses claim it to be.   
 
2.3 The Beginnings of Social Media 
Social media in today’s digital society has become very much a way of life for 
many users but what is social media exactly? Geert Lovink’s book, titled Networks 
Without a Cause, a critique of Social Media, delves into the whole web 2.0 digital 
culture by examining various aspects of digital phenomenon ranging from comment 
culture (50), to blogging (95), including a meta-analysis on what he claims to be the 
failures of critical theory and its larger field, media studies (76). Interestingly, despite 
him using various terms such as ‘social-networking sites’, ‘network cultures’, ‘user-
generated content’ and quoting examples of Facebook and Twitter, he never quite 
mentions the term ‘social media’ at all in his book, apart from the mention of it in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Toffler uses the term prosumer to describe the phenomenon where common 
consumers transformed their roles to become active in the process of the design of 
products. See Toffler, Alvin. The third wave. New York: Bantam. 1984. Print !
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book’s cover. Would this be because for Lovink, media has become an “empty 
signifier” (76), or a “slippery object of study”? (77). It is rather puzzling then that 
despite the vast popularity of social media, the question of what exactly social media 
is has not quite been posed.  
 
I remember my own experience with what has now come to be termed ‘social’ 
media. It was in late 2002 when I first had a Friendster account. Then, the experience 
of owning the Friendster account was rather thrilling. It was seen as a ‘cool’ thing to 
have a Friendster account. I could do various things with it, upload a profile picture, 
post information such as my favourite books or movies, add connections and friends, 
etc. The account allowed me to play around with various new media objects14, and 
such an experience on other websites were previously unheard of. This form of 
freedom was quite exhilarating and unique in a sense. 
 
The use of the term play is important here. It relates strongly to the 
interactivity of the medium then. The feeling that Friendster aroused was that it 
elevated my status to a creator. I could (re)create or simulate myself online. Yet, such 
a form of digital play is not play in its purest sense, that is socially spontaneous, 
participatory and intimate, but instead a form of play that is “managed and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Here, I deviate slightly from Lev Manovich’s conception of new media objects as 
“a still digital image, a digitally composited film, a virtual 3D environment, a 
computer game, a self-contained hypermedia DVD, a hypermedia Web site, or the 
Web as a whole” (Manovich, 39). Instead, I refer to new media objects in the form of 
functions within the space of the social networking sites. !
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rationalized” hence ‘produced’ and commodified for the digital sphere (Kline, Dyer-
Witheford and De Peuter, 244).  
 
But today, it is different with Facebook. While some elements of simulated 
‘play’ have been retained, such as the ability to ‘poke’ a friend and so on, already, 
there are implicit rules of conduct within Facebook even though Facebook was 
modeled after Friendster. There is a heavy sense of realism inscribed within social 
networks today. In the early stages of using Facebook, I remember some of the 
language associated with Facebook was rather peculiar. When I asked some of my 
peers if they had a Facebook account, some of them replied, “Oh, I don’t play (with) 
Facebook”. Again, the concept of play was heavily associated with social networks. 
Somehow, along the way, this concept of play was dropped replaced with the term 
‘use’. But, in the use of my own language of ‘play’ and interaction with the new 
media objects, clearly both Heidegger and McLuhan’s notion of ‘blindness’ was at 
work then. I was, in a way, ‘blind’ to the notion that that form of play is but a 
simulation. It has already been calculated, predicted and envisaged by the designers of 
social networks. It was perhaps then not me ‘playing’ with the new media objects, but 
vice versa, the designers of social networks ‘playing’ with me, reflecting Manovich’s 
totalitarian grip of designers. It is thus an extremely contrived sense of ‘play’. What 
do we create on social networks then? We start by creating a character. We then 
slowly imbue it with information and mould it to become more like us. We achieve 
this through various rituals that are prescribed by the affordances of social media. In 




Despite all these new features of social media, it would be incorrect to 
conceive social media as an entirely new form of media that has suddenly been 
discovered and is completely divergent from previous media. It is not exactly a 
revolution, a radical break or sudden, inexplicable rupture that occurred, as what some 
net theorists seem to be claiming it is. Slightly before the explosion of such social 
media technologies, it has already been argued that the Internet has taken an 
interactive turn, also known as ‘Web 2.0’, coined by Darcy DiNucci15 to signify the 
shift from “monolithic and typical brochure-like displays” on static web pages to 
spaces where ‘everyone’ can become an author (221). Everyone, in this case, of 
course refers to those who already have a certain level of digital literacy. Before the 
presence of social media, there already existed Web 2.0 platforms such as blogs, 
discussion forums, and participatory news sites that were also heralded as a new 
frontier of free speech. It seems that all the previous web 2.0 technologies has now 
converged into a single unified term called social media. But what is the cultural 
significance of this turn to the social?   
 
If we go further back time however, even before Web 2.0, older forms of 
media such as television and radio had already started to incorporate notions of 
audience feedback and interactivity into its form, through the advent of ‘reality’ TV, 
and also radio and television talk and game shows that allowed the audience to phone 
in. In this sense then, consumers of media content were invited to give their 
‘feedback’, to not only consume but also ‘speak up’ and participate in the production 
of media content. Even before television and radio, the daily press had already opened !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Di Nucci, Darcy. “Fragmented future”. Print 53(4): 32, 221–222. 1999 
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up spaces for their readers, through the conception of the “letters to the editor” page. 
Walter Benjamin commented on this phenomenon, stating “the distinction between 
author and public is about to lose its basic character”, for  “the difference becomes 
merely functional… at any moment the reader is ready to turn into a writer” 
(Benjamin, 9). Again then, we encounter this transition from consumer to producer, or 
the act of prosumption, as others have called it.  
 
Hence, the participatory aspect of social media was never quite new to begin 
with. It was only through the processes of publicity of the consumer society that 
created the illusion of it being new and exciting, and perhaps even revolutionary. The 
beginnings of social media thus does not lie in the platforms of social networks such 
as Facebook or Twitter, but social media began when the mass media like the radio 
and television began to engage the masses, when it started becoming ‘interactive’. In 
this case, social media is not exactly specific technologies such as Facebook, Twitter 
or the like, but rather it is the state that the Internet has adopted and now become. 
Like its predecessors of television, radio and news media, the Internet has now 
become more ‘social’. However, similar to the adoption of the term ‘smart’, the 
Internet could perhaps also be argued to be ever less ‘social’.  
 
The point that I am making, that social media was never new to begin with, is 
not a new one either. As Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin, in their book Remediation, 




“No medium today, and certainly no single media event, seems to do its 
cultural work in isolation from other media, any more than it works in 
isolation from other social and economic forces. What is new about new 
media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older media 
and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the 
challenges of new media.” (15) 
 
Perhaps then, a more accurate description of the current social media phenomenon 
would be the shift from a select few whom were previously able to interact, to the 
current phase where ‘everyone’ can interact, or ‘everyone’ becomes a producer of 
sorts, a trend that has been loosely, or perhaps even wrongly defined as “democratic”. 
Though this might appear to be “democratic”, the later part of this thesis will 
challenge this notion of “democratic” participation in the age of social media.  
 
2.4 The Reversible: Consumer to Producer 
Back in 1970, leftist media theorist Hans Magnus Enzensberger already 
imagined this radical scenario, as a solution to the problems of capitalism, in the form 
of a socialist media theory. He envisioned a “reversibility of circuits” where everyone 
makes use of the media, since media equipment are not only “means of consumption 
but also means of production” and since these equipment such as tape recorders and 
cameras were already increasingly available to wage earners (Enzensberger, 
“Constituents of a Theory of the Media” 266). In a rather familiar stance, 
Enzensberger claimed that “for the first time in history, the media make possible the 
participation of the masses in a collective process that is social and socialized, 
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participation in which the practical means are in the hands of the masses themselves” 
(Enzensberger, 97). 
 
In opposition to these ideas, Jean Baudrillard strongly criticized the position of 
Enzensberger. Baudrillard argues that the position that Enzensberg adopts already 
assumes that new media structurally has a liberating function, and this problematic 
position has been the same one uncritically taken since the time of Marx (Baudrillard, 
“Requiem for the Media”, 168). Marxist theory, as explicated by Louis Althusser in 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, argues that the role of the media, as an 
ideological state apparatus, was always to reproduce the ideology of the ruling class, 
i.e. the bourgeois capitalist class (Althusser, 129). Thus Enzensberger repeats this 
claim, stating that control of the media is in the hands of the dominant classes who 
divert them to their own advantage. But for Enzensberger and other Marxist theorists, 
as Baudrillard argues, the media remains “fundamentally egalitarian”, but it is 
corrupted by the capitalist order (168). Hence, the task is for revolutionary praxis to 
unleash this “potentiality inscribed in the media” (ibid).    
 
Baudrillard argued that it is a big mistake to assume that the media is 
fundamentally egalitarian, pointing out the irony in the claim that something is 
liberatory, yet constantly in need of liberation, because this would also simultaneously 
assume that the media is inherently neutral. He calls Enzensberger’s desire to 
transform the media into a true medium of communication the “same dream that 
haunts the Marxist imaginary: strip objects of their exchange value in order to restore 
their use value” (168), the defetishizing of commodity. The standpoint that media is 
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structurally liberating relies on the underlying problematic conception of media as 
mere transmittors of ideology, as if the ideology of the dominant classes existed 
somewhere outside and beyond the media and is simply channeled through the media. 
Instead, while he agrees that the media is ideological, he argues that they are “not co-
efficients, but effectors of ideology” (169), thus they were never “non-neutral or non-
ideological” to begin with (ibid).   
 
Baudrillard rejects Enzensberger and instead adopts the position of McLuhan, 
positing that his phrase “The medium is the message” is the true key to understanding 
ideology within media. In paraphrasing McLuhan, Baudrillard contends that:  
 
Marx, in his materialist analysis of production, had virtually circumscribed 
productive forces as a privileged domain from which language, signs, and 
communication in general found themselves excluded. In fact, Marx does not 
even provide for a genuine theory of railroads as “media,” as modes of 
communication: they hardly enter into consideration.” (Baudrillard, “Requiem 
for the Media”, 164)16 
 
In this powerful critique of Marx, supplemented with the semiology of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and Roland Barthes, Baudrillard argues that through the 
valorization of productive forces that excludes language, signs and communication, 
Marxist theory becomes inadequate for analyzing media, for it is “incapable of 
responding to a social process that far exceeds material production” (166). He blames !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 c.f. Marshall McLuhan,“War and Peace in the Global Village” (New York, 1968) 
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the Marxist preconceptions of misunderstanding the exchange of signs as mere 
“pragmatic functional use” and its obsession with “material production and 
“productive labour” (167). 
 
Baudrillard instead analyzes the commodity from a more radical perspective, 
to consider it not merely as a material object but as a vehicle of communication, a 
Sign. While production was the primary starting point for Marx, Baudrillard inverts 
this presupposition and argues that the analysis of the commodity in contemporary 
societies should no longer be based on production but this position should be reversed 
to its opposite, i.e., consumption. For Baudrillard, consumption is not merely the 
passive recipient of production through the satisfaction of needs but rather it is an 
active process in “the manipulation of signs” towards the creation of a “person” and 
its integration within the system (Mendoza, 47-48). Thus, consumption is rather the 
consumption of signs that then determines the ‘person’s’ status or privilege in society.  
In doing so then, consumption of a commodity is no longer just consumption based on 
a need, in the traditional Marxist sense of a use-value, but rather, it is based on the 
consumption of a Sign and what it signifies. Here, Baudrillard introduces his notion of 
the Sign-value, which he argues is central to consumption, for it is the “the stage 
where the commodity is immediately produced as a sign, as a sign-value and where 
signs are produced as commodities” (Baudrillard, “For a Critique of the Political 
Economy of the Sign,” 147). This is also strongly seen in social media, where the 
kinds of information a user consume and produce (prosume), becomes intrinsically 
tied to the self-identity that the user wishes to portray, instead of the fulfillment of a 




When Enzensberger states that transforming the media is not “technically a 
problem”, Baudrillard then plays on his words in by agreeing so because “media 
ideology functions at the level of form, at the level of the separation it establishes, 
which is a social division” (168-169), a point which Debord also takes up. He then 
argues that at the level of form, the base structure of the media operates on 
communication being abstracted into a “simple transition-reception of a message”, 
where “the system of social control and power” is rooted within (169-170). Following 
this, he concludes that all processes of exchange are then “impossible”, except in the 
form of a simulated response. As he declares, “they speak (the media), or something 
is spoken there, but in such a way as to exclude any response anywhere” (170). Thus, 
for Baudrillard, the media ‘monopolizes’ speech, for “it is a speech that answers itself 
via the simulated detour of a response, and here as well, the absolutization of speech 
under the formal guise of exchange” (ibid). It is and never will be an equal exchange 
of speech and response under the existing totalizing architecture of media. To 
consider feedback (a simulated response), as Enzensberger does, as a revolutionary 
reversal of power, would therefore be a futile illusion.          
 
Even if there were a “reversibility of circuits”, as Enzensberger puts it, it does 
not quite “destroy the private production methods of bourgeois intellectuals” 
(Enzensberger, 267), as Baudrillard points out that such reversals were already part of 
the media system in the form of letters to the editor, phone-in programs and poll, and 
yet they do not concede response nor change the original role between the sender and 
receiver. For Baudrillard, despite the possibility for the roles to be overturned in a 
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‘revolutionary’ solution’ where everyone becomes a manipulator, or what he terms 
the “critical reversal of the ideological concept of manipulation” (Baudrillard, 182), 
the category of transmitter, and therefore the fundamental structure of the political 
economy of communication, i.e. the structure of late capitalism, that underpins the 
media is still preserved.  
 
Baudrillard further analyzes Enzensberger’s ideas and suggests that the only 
way to rehumanize communication and restore a simultaneous ‘response’ in the form 
of the original symbolic exchange, instead of a cybernetic one that preserves the 
underlying political economy of communication, would be to demolish the code, 
which can only be done at level of form (the form/content divide)17. Changing the 
message (content) through feedback would only retain the unequal power structure 
and thus obstruct any potential of true change, resulting in practices of manipulation 
at both ends (sender and receiver).  
 
In other words, the strategy of subversion by reversing the roles of consumer 
to producer does not quite produce a strategy of revolution. As Marx put it, 
production and consumption are but two sides of the same coin. It merely signals a 
newer phase in advanced capitalism. All media does and can do is to simulate 
communication, and that, to Baudrillard, is a form of non-communication. It is non-
communication because it has been transformed into a model of communication, 
neutralized into signs, and deprived of meaning. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 This argument is also repeated by film theorist Jean-Louis Baudry and further 
explained in chapter 3.2. 
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Chapter Three. The narrative of participation: Participation as resistance? 
 
The reversal of the role of the consumer to producer, premised on the 
emancipatory potential of the media, relies on the active participation of the ‘masses’, 
as Enzenberger notes above. As I repeat his quote, “the media make possible the 
participation of the masses in a collective process that is social and socialized, 
participation in which the practical means are in the hands of the masses themselves” 
(Enzensberger, 97). For Enzenberger, to be able to participate is to resist the 
hegemony of capitalism and it is through the liberation of the media that resistance 
lies.  
 
The notion of participation today, because of its intimate relationship with the 
emancipatory politics and resistance, remains fundamentally important, as 
Enzenberger pointed out. Besides Enzenberger, the narratives of democracy also 
suggests that in order for a democracy to work, it requires the active participation of 
citizens in the society, either through voting or dissent, to participate in public life and 
become informed on public issues so as to be able to act collectively and hold public 
officials accountable (National Democratic Institute, n. pag.) However, as Jacques 
Rancière explains in The Uses of Democracy, such a form of participation is a 
“mongrel” idea produced through the conflation of two ideas: “the reformist idea of 
necessary mediations between the centre and the periphery, and the revolutionary idea 
of the permanent involvement of citizen-subjects in every domain” (Rancière, “The 
Uses of Democracy”, 60). He argues that because of this conflation, participation 
becomes a symbolic exercise that merely fills up the empty spaces left by power. 
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Instead, he locates genuine participation as the “unpredictable subject who 
momentarily occupies the street” and the “ever open possibility of the fresh 
emergence of this fleeting subject” (61), rather than “a fixed space of allocated 
participation whose counter-power is dependent on the dominant order” (Bishop, 
“Participation and Spectacle: Where Are We Now?” n. pag.).  
 
Even so, within the domain of art and politics, the role of participation remains 
crucial, particularly during the sixties. In 1959, American artist Allan Kaprow 
developed a term ‘Happening’, also the title of one of his artwork, that was slowly 
popularized into a movement, which spurred the advent of participatory art. The basic 
idea, as Kaprow describes, was to “increase the responsibility of the observer” with a 
view on “eliminating audiences” altogether (Cornwell, 204) so as to transform them 
into participants and hence elevate them to become co-creators of the artwork.  
 
Thus in a way, the basic premise of participation, whether genuine or non-
genuine, as fundamentally and morally good is already deeply inscribed within 
Western and developed societies in general. Moreover, the concept of participation 
remains firmly romanticized and celebrated as benevolent, particularly in the domain 
of participatory art, as I will later show. In this chapter, I will seek to examine in 
detail the role of voluntary participation in the context of social media today. As 
already argued in the earlier chapters, voluntary participation itself remains a key 
ideological feature of social media. The transition from receiver to sender, consumer 
to producer itself relies on invoking a form of voluntary participation, for the 
consumer or user to participate in the process. In order to fully understand the 
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implications of voluntary participation within social media, it is first necessary to 
understand the theoretical framework of participation and in this chapter, I will retrace 
the concept of participation in the domain of film, art and then demonstrate how some 
concerns within these domains still remain valid and relevant in the context of social 
media. Examining the historical precursors of social media would also demonstrate 
how participation in previous media forms is remediated in social media, but rather 
than being a strategy of subversion, participation becomes co-opted within social 
media and as a result this nullifies, or perhaps reverses the effect of participation as a 
form resistance.  
 
3.1 Participation as opposition to the Spectacle 
The activation or physical involvement of the audience in any form did not 
first begin with Kaprow. As Dinkla notes, already in Futurist and Dadaist manifestos, 
audience participation was seen as key to reducing the distance between performer 
and audience (Dinkla, 279). While the Futurists used the concept of audience 
participation mainly in stage-like performances, Dinkla traces one of the very first 
form of participation in exhibitions to the second Dada exhibition in 1920, held in the 
backyard of the Bauhaus Winter in Cologne, where Max Ernst placed an axe next to 
his art work, so that the audience could use it to destroy his work if they did not like 
it, offering the audience a chance to explicitly and directly intervene in the exhibition 
(Dinkla, 279-280).   
 
Kaprow’s Happenings and other various art movements during the sixties such 
as Fluxus were significant because their increasing reliance on audience participation 
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had deep political implications due to the realization that such forms of participation 
made it possible to challenge the authority of the artist. As Cornwell observes, even 
before Kaprow, another artist, Rauschenberg, with the aid of engineers and 
technicians, started to use technology to create intricate art works that involved the 
participation of the audience. As Cornwell describes one particular art work titled 
Soundings created by Rauschenberg in 1968:  
 
The viewer entered a darkened room faced with an "8-by-36 foot partially 
mirrorized panel," behind which were two transparent panels with silk-
screened images of chairs in black and white with adjustable spot lights on 
them. If the perceiver did nothing, only his or her reflection appeared dimly in 
the darkened room. It was necessary to speak or generate other sounds to 
activate the work. "When groups of the light bulbs are triggered by sound, the 
frontal mirror becomes translucent and illuminated images of the chairs are 
seen through it." (Cornwell, 205) 
 
Klüver and Martin surmise their description of Kaprow’s Soundings as follows:  
 
“To explore the work, you have to continue talking or singing. If several 
people are there with you, the situation is one of participation, competitiveness 
and cooperation as viewers try to extract more and more images from the 
darkness. The constantly moving image of the chairs gives you the same 




Technology was used by Rauschenberg “to make the viewer responsible for the 
artwork that he or she sees”. As Klüver and Martin observe, “Earlier I was the artist. 
Now the viewer will make the image, not I” (ibid). As such, they suggest that this 
form of participatory art threatens the traditional divide between the artist and the 
viewer, offering a space for the viewer to be involved in the production of the 
artwork, closing the gap between the mass audience and art, performer and audience. 
Also, the locations that were selected for such Happening events included garages, 
shops, or even in the streets, were intentionally chosen away from art galleries and 
museums so as to contribute to the idea of abolishing the exclusivity of exhibition 
venues (Dinkla, 281).    
 
Another important artist, Yoko Ono, identified with the Fluxus movement, 
created a significant amount of work that required active participation from her 
viewers, participation that was perhaps even more direct than the work of 
Rauschenberg (Cornwell, 205-206). In one of her more prominent work that 
exemplified the concept of audience participation entitled Cut Piece, she invited 
audience members to come on stage, use a pair of scissors and cut of pieces of her 
clothing as she sat on the stage motionless facing the audience. Thus, Ono’s Cut Piece 
was able to reverse the artist’s position of authority, since the artist’s role (Ono) 
became an entirely passive one in relation to the audience, which becames active 
through participation.  
 
Despite the potential of audience intervention and participation however, as 
Dinkla argues, Kaprow’s Happenings and similar other art forms clearly demonstrates 
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that not all forms of participation will inevitably result in a higher sense of 
responsibility for the viewer and hence a less authoritarian role of the artist. For 
Dinkla, the possibilities of ‘true’ audience intervention in Kaprow’s Happenings 
“remain limited” (Dinkla, 282). She quotes Johannes Schröder, “Under this condition 
[of absolute control by the organizer] the Happening does not seem to be a step 
toward viewer participation, but a precisely elaborated artistic act that guarantees the 
integration of the participations as a material (ibid). She further elaborates by arguing 
that in most of Kaprow’s “participation” in Happenings, participation was still 
‘staged’ in a way and the audience were not as unprepared as Kaprow claims. 
Instructions and scripts for the audience were always present which resulted in the 
performers’ behaviour being “controlled” (ibid). Thus, she claims, “rather, 
participation is located along a fragile border between emancipatory act and 
manipulation”.  
 
Furthermore, Dinkla highlights the necessity of differentiating between 
nontechnical participation and technically mediated participation (simulation). In 
technically mediated participation, or interactive art in general, Dinkla convincingly 
argues that while the artist might withdraw into a more passive role (similar to Yoko 
Ono’s position in Cut Piece), the authorial leader role is essentially delegated to the 
interactive system. Thus, the introduction of technical means of control in art 
effectively “automates” participation, making it an automated ‘event’ (288).  
 
Claire Bishop explains the reason why participation remains fundamentally 
important in the role of art and artists: “it re-humanizes a society rendered numb and 
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fragmented by the repressive instrumentality of capitalist production” (Bishop, n. 
pag.). Thus, by using social participation as a strategy in the creation of the artwork, 
the goal is to resist the passivity and combat the alienation that contemporary 
capitalism produces in their subjects. This is seen not only in interactive and 
participatory art, but also across the domain of film and theatre.  
 
3.2 Theatre, Film and Participation 
Similar to the goal of participation as a social strategy in the domain of art, 
Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht, through the medium of theatre, also sought to 
radicalize the form of theatre through ‘activating’ the audience, in what is known as 
‘Epic theatre’. As Walter Benjamin writes, “Epic theatre casts doubts upon the notion 
that theatre is entertainment. It shakes the social validity of theatre-as-entertainment 
by robbing it of its function within the capitalist system. It also threatens the 
privileges of the critics” (Benjamin, “Understanding Brecht”, 9). The role of epic 
theatre, is not only to develop actions (audience participation), but represent 
conditions. It aims to avoid reproducing conditions, but seeks to reveal conditions as 
they are, so as to induce recognition (4, 5). The function, is to “revive a Socratic 
praxis”, where the audience is ‘shocked’ or ‘astonished’ and hence reconfigured into 
an ‘interested’ audience who questions and thinks, deriving a “lively and productive 
consciousness” (4).  
 
In other words, Brechtian practice stigmatizes the theatrical illusion that 
entraps the spectator in a heightened state of passivity. Brecht works towards 
dispelling the illusion through the creation of an active and critical spectator, to 
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produce a thinking subject through the performance. For Brecht, the spectator has to 
reject the identification process with the spectacle and increase the distance between 
the spectator and spectacle, so as to truly see the theatre for what it is, nothing but an 
illusion. Brecht calls for a questioning critical spectator, one that is made aware of 
their social material conditions of production and rejects the passivity and conformity 
of the theatre, again, to be inalienated in an increasingly alienating world.   
 
In cinema, the film spectator, like the art and theatre audience (before the 
advent of participatory art), on a primary level, remains passive to the image 
displayed before them, much like in Plato’s allegory of the cave, where the prisoners 
are shackled by chains, condemned eternally to watch the shadows on the wall, never 
realizing it is an illusion masked as reality. Although it is technically and physically 
impossible for the film spectator to socially participate in a film since it does not 
unfold ‘live’ in front of the spectator, various film directors also sought to denounce 
passivity and inalienate the spectator not through direct ‘active’ participation from the 
spectator but instead through a similar process in the creation of an active and self-
reflexive spectator.  
 
Film theorists such as Baudry and Metz argue that the subject that the 
cinematic apparatus produces is problematic because cinema itself produces certain 
ideological effects, one of them being a fundamental misrecognition of the unity of 
the self and its continuity with the world. The filmic apparatus, as Baudry explains, 
relies on the “illusion of continuity”, that is “dependent on the persistence of vision, 
restored from discontinuous elements.” (Baudry, 42) At the level of technical 
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apparatus, even though difference is marked by frames in a reel and moments in time 
and space, this difference itself has to be effaced or repressed in order for meaning to 
emerge. Through the projection process, the difference is minimized and repressed 
through the rapid succession of images enabling a narrative continuity. That is why 
Baudry concludes that film paradoxically “lives on the denial of difference: difference 
is necessary for it to live, but it lives on its negation” (ibid).  
 
Because it fulfills two key conditions, the suspension of mobility as well as the 
predominance of the visual function, since cinema subjects are isolated in a darkened 
room and made to watch a screen that functions like a mirror, Baudry goes on to liken 
the conditions of watching a film to the Lacanian Mirror-Stage process (45). In the 
mirror-stage, the subject misrecognizes itself and imagines itself as a whole and 
unified being, a sort of unification of the fragmented body. However, in film, the 
transcendental subject of the camera “unites into a meaningful whole the 
discontinuous fragments of phenomena” (Kim, 54-55). To put it in another way, the 
spectator, at the primary level, identifies not with that which is represented on the 
screen (the content or the spectacle) but rather, with the unified transcendental subject 
of the camera instead, or “what stages the spectacle, what makes it seen, obliging him 
to see what the camera sees” (Baudry, 45). Therefore, in cinema, the false ‘reality’ is 
not exactly the image on the screen but rather, as Baudry argues, a “simulation of the 
condition of the subject, the position of the subject and not of reality” (46).  
 
For Baudry then, the filmic apparatus induces a “state of artifical regression” 
(56) As Kim explains, the intensity of attachment to the images and the process of 
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identification as a form of ideological control is accepted by the spectators because it 
feeds their unconscious desires (55). Baudry thus concludes that the “specific function 
fulfilled by the cinema” is the “support and instrument of ideology” since “it 
constitutes the ‘subject’- by the illusory delimitation of a central location-whether this 
be that of a god or of any other substitute” (46). Cinema could therefore be thought of 
as an “apparatus destined to obtain a precise ideological effect, necessary to the 
dominant ideology” through “creating a fantasmatization of the subject, it collaborates 
with a marked efficacity in the maintenance of idealism” (ibid). In other words, in a 
rather Althusserian fashion, as Kim puts it, cinema “collapses the plural, 
heterogeneous, complex, analyzable subject, into the unanalyzable collective subject” 
that naturalizes and reproduces the dominant ideology (55). This is hence considered 
the primary ideological mechanism of film (ibid).  
 
To resist this form of interpellation, Baudry suggests that there is a need to 
“disturb cinematic elements”, or disrupt the primary identification form, through 
making the processes of film-making visible to the audience (34), citing the work of 
Vertov in The Man With a Movie Camera, since he argues that “the ideological 
mechanism at work in the cinema is concentrated in the relation between camera and 
subject” (ibid). Also, like Baudrillard and McLuhan, Baudry privileged ‘form’ over 
‘content’, adding that as long as primary identification remains possible, “forms of 
narratives adopted, or the ‘contents’ of the image, are of little importance” (ibid). Yet, 
as I would later argue, such a strategy of postmodern self-referentiality or self-
reflexivity would no longer be subversive for it has been subsumed by capitalism and 
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becomes emblematic of late-capitalism, reflected particularly in the form of social 
media.  
  
The French New Wave cinema movement was a strong proponent of such 
strategies, and one particular filmmaker, Jean-Luc Godard is well known for his 
manipulation of the cinematic aesthetics to achieve this effect. The aesthetics of 
Godard films contemplate the subject of his enquiry. The traces of early Godard’s 
leftist influences can be clearly seen within his films, which Mulvey terms as his 
Debord phase where he examined the society of the spectacle and spectacle of 
consumerism with Une Femme Mariée (1964) and Deux ou Trois Choses que je sais 
d’elle (1972), and his Marxist phase where he scrutinized the façade of consumerism 
at the direct process of the commodity’s production: the factory, with British Sounds 
(1969) and Tout va bien (1972).  
 
According to Mulvey, Godard works can be analyzed through three elements, 
the cinema, the body and the commodity, in which all three elements relates to the 
concept of the fetishism. It is as Mulvey proposed, “if the shiny glossy surface 
fascination of the screen could be unmasked, to reveal the process of production 
concealed behind it, the film would be stripped of its fetishistic aspects” (Mulvey, 77). 
Mulvey then goes on to describe Godard’s films as a desire to “free cinema into the 
complex space and time of intertextual reference, direct address, self-reflexivity, 
material specificity”, one that “parallels the Marxist desire to defetishize the 
commodity, by making visible, through political analysis, the specificity of its process 
of production” (ibid). Godard’s strategy is clear, through overt visibility and the 
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revealing of the mechanics of production, he aimed to free the spectator and rid the 
alienating and illusory effects of the cinematic apparatus to create an active and self-
reflexive spectator.  
 
Kim notes that the ideological mechanism in the cinematic apparatus functions 
similarly to Žižek’s notion of ideological fantasy. Because the identification process 
that makes the film viewing process possible is based on a misrecognition that 
represses the discontinuity of the shots and imagines the continuity of the film, the 
subject is essentially accepting the fundamental fantasy of the “transcendental subject 
of the camera” and simultaneously accepting the “interpellation of the camera as 
capital-S Subject.” Thus, the ideological fantasy itself is instrumental to the 
functioning of an ideological reality (55-56), acting as a support to reality, rather than 
a form of false consciousness.   
 
However, Kim also points out that the assumption that mimetic realism 
automatically produces a passive subject that is ideologically malleable is rather 
problematic. She suggests the possibility of realism having a positive ideological 
function and questions the other assumption that every film viewer is necessarily 
passive, and she lists other forms of resistance such as leaving the theatre, talking 
back to the screen or having an entirely different interpretation.  
 
3.3 From Art and Film to Social media  
As the narratives of participation across the different domains of film and art 
seem to suggest, participation and visibility is seen as an act of resistance, a form of 
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emancipation of the subject. This myth of emancipation is likewise heavily repeated 
in the media, as dominant forms of social media such as Facebook and Twitter 
becomes mythologized as emancipatory tools that empower individuals precisely 
because they allow for participation of the masses online.  
 
The above statement that suggests a simple relation between participation and 
emancipation is problematic insofar as it completely disregards the context in which 
participation remained a key strategy in the sixties. Within the context of social media 
and technology today, as Lovink enlightens us, the main difference is that we are 
“explicitly requested to interact and no longer addressed as an anonymous mass of 
passive consumers, unlike before” (Lovink, 147). Even before Lovink, Baudrillard 
already warned us of this impending problem. As he says: 
 
Everywhere the masses are encouraged to speak, they are urged to live 
socially, electorally, organizationally, sexually, in participation, in festival, in 
free speech, etc. The spectre must be exorcised, it must pronounce its name. 
Nothing shows more dramatically that the only genuine problem today is the 
silence of the mass, the silence of the silent majority. (Baudrillard, “In the 
Shadow of the Silent Majority”, 23-24) 
 
For Baudrillard, the strategy or resistance of the masses was their passivity itself. As 




The strategy of power has long seemed founded on the apathy of the masses. 
The more passive they were, the more secure it was. But this logic is only 
characteristic of the bureaucratic and centralist phase of power. And it is this 
which today turns against it: the inertia it has fostered becomes the sign of its 
own death. That is why it seeks to reverse its strategies: from passivity to 
participation, from silence to speech. But it is too late. The threshold of the 
“critical mass,” that of the involution of the social through inertia, is exceeded. 
(23) 
 
However, I argue that the problem today is no longer the silence of the silent majority. 
As I would demonstrate later, I argue, in agreement with Baudrillard, that the entire 
binary of passive and active binary has already collapsed in the age of social media 
such that we have no choice but to be active ‘users’ when using social media.  
 
Žižek recognizes this same problem and proposes an interesting thesis in 
relation to the notion of participation, suggesting that this ‘need’ to construct 
ourselves as an active participant, instead of being in opposition to the aliening effects 
of contemporary capitalism effectively renders us as further complicit and subservient 
to the needs of neo liberal capitalism so as to ensure its own successful functioning. 
According to Žižek: 
 
“The threat today is not passivity but pseudo-activity, the urge to “be active,” 
to “participate,” to mask the Nothingness of what goes on. People intervene all 
the time, “do something”; academics participate in meaningless “debates,” and 
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so forth, and the truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw from all this. 
Those in power often prefer even a “critical” participation, a dialogue, to 
silence—just to engage us in a “dialogue,” to make sure our ominous passivity 
is broken. (Žižek, “The Obscene Knot of Ideology and How to Untie It”, 334) 
 
He cites Alan Badiou’s provocative thesis: “It is better to do nothing than to 
contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire 
already recognizes as existent.” Žižek paraphrases Badiou and argues that doing 
nothing might be better than to “engage in localized acts whose ultimate function is to 
make the system run more smoothly, through acts like providing space for the 
multitude of new subjectivities, and so on” (ibid).  
 
He employs a unique term to describe this form of activity or active 
participation today, calling it an “interpassive” mode of participation, rather than 
interactive form of communication. He argues that in this ‘interpassive’ mode of 
participation where we are constantly ‘actively’ participating in various aspects of 
socio-ideological life, it is not participation to ensure any kind of social change but 
rather, participation to ensure that nothing will happen, and that nothing will change 
at all (Žižek, 342). He therefore suggests that the “proper radical political gesture”, the 
act of defiance and resistance to the contemporary condition today instead might be to 
be ‘passively aggressive’ rather than ‘aggressively passive’.  
 
Another problem is also that the form participation takes today, within the 
sphere of digital media, is one that is highly digitized, hence a form of simulation 
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because it is already commodified and turned into sign-value, rather than the form of 
participation that art and film relied on previously. The denouncement of passivity 
and liberation to an active subject is increasingly achieved through technologically 
mediated processes that simulate and automate. Following Dinkla’s delineation of 
technically mediated participation, where she considers non-technically mediated 
participation to be a purer and more authentic form of participation, and her argument 
that technical mediated participation effectively automates participation and transfers 
the authority of the artist to the interactive system, there is a pressing need to re-
consider what participation in the age of social media really represents. Pursuing 
Žižek’s train of thought then, I agree with Bishop’s analysis, in that “far from being 
oppositional to spectacle, participation has now entirely merged with it” (Bishop, 6). 
Hence, in this thesis, I argue that participation, in the age of social media, has become 














Chapter Four: Participation in the age of Social media 
 
In the age of social media, participation has been digitally coded into signs 
such as ‘comment, ‘like’, ‘tweet’, etc. that allow for a seemingly easier and more 
efficient way of communicating with one another online. There are also implicit rules 
and cultural norms within different social networking sites. Participation online, for 
most users, has already been transformed into a practice that is governed by rituals 
such as scrolling down the news feed to get information, ‘liking’, ‘sharing’ a post or 
commenting on a status – all prescribed by the affordances of new media technology.  
 
In chapter two, I argued that the idea of audience participation is not exactly 
one that is new because it has always existed even in previous forms of older media. 
However, as identified earlier, within social media now, the user is already constantly 
active and always participating. Even if the user does not post information online or 
partake in any of the aforementioned social media rituals, the instance of using social 
media to view different pages for information already designates the user as ‘active’ 
because the page-browsing habits of the user will be tracked by the technology behind 
social media through the clicks the user makes. For example, a Facebook user may 
not upload any pictures of himself or post statuses regularly, but just by looking at 
what people share or different Facebook pages that the user may be interested in, such 
as the football club Arsenal page for instance, the user already automatically 
generates data for Facebook and by virtue of that, becomes implicated as an ‘active’ 
user. Social media has therefore already collapsed the active/passive binary, making it 
!!
60!
clearly impossible to be a passive user at all in social media, unless one completely 
opts out of using it.   
 
As we can see, participation is intrinsically linked to the notion of 
consumption. The forms of participation in the age of social media are no more than 
an obligatory sign of consumption. As explained in chapter three, the advent of social 
media has also collapsed the binary of consumption and production, rendering the 
user a prosumer who simultaneously produces and consumes information. However, 
rather than this being a form of empowerment of the user, I argue that this instead 
administers a form of consumption that further exploits creative forms of user labour.  
 
4.1 Participation as the myth of co-creation  
Paradoxically, it is precisely the nature of voluntary participation that enables 
social media to function. The very basis of social media is the proliferation of 
information produced by its users. Without the participation of its users, social 
networks will not survive, for the sole reason that people visit social networks to 
consume information that other users provide, whether it is a ‘status update’, a photo, 
a news article that was shared, or various other snippets of information that social 
networks commodifies. Thus, the economic value of the various social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc. is primarily determined by their 
ability to command the contribution and production of information by users, in short, 
user-generated content. The economic success of YouTube, measured by the sale of 
YouTube to Google for US$1.65 billion within the first two years of its creation, was 
made possible only through the willingness of YouTube users to (re)produce their 
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lives and the lives of others online for mass consumption (Zwick, Bonsu and 
Darmody, 180). Similarly, other user-generated social media sites “expropriate the 
cultural labour of the masses to convert it into monetary value”, perhaps in different 
ways but all according to the same general logic (ibid).  
 
As we can see then, the idea of social media participation is deeply entwined 
with the process of prosumption that was briefly discussed in chapter two. Instead of 
employing the term ‘prosumption’, Zwick, Bonsu and Darmody term the phenomenon 
of voluntary participation as the “turn towards co-creation” and suggests that it 
“represents one of the most advanced strategies for capitalist accumulation and 
consumer control” because it reshapes the landscape of marketing into a “supply 
function for free, unpaid, and more or less autonomous consumer labor processes.” 
(Zwick et al. ,177). Drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, they explain:  
 
“It (co-creation) is a form of government of consumers that gives birth to an 
active consumer whose independent, creative, and voluntary activities can 
now effectively be channeled into raw material for the firm’s commodity 
production.” (ibid) 
 
Co-creation in social media thus bears much similarity to the situation of participatory 
art, where audiences do not merely become elevated to the role of a co-creator of the 
artwork, but rather, in the process of becoming a co-creator, the audience also 
becomes ‘used’ as a raw material in the production of the artwork, exploited as an 
dehumanized object, in a way not unlike the Heideggerian ‘resource’. Since users are 
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not being paid for their cultural labour performed on social media, but are subtly 
manipulated to co-produce this form of product and service online that generates 
economic value for only the social media owners, this amounts to an expropriation of 
the surplus value from the user’s labour. Thus, from a Marxist point of view, co-
creation results in the exploitation of users even if it is performed voluntarily and in 
spite of the pleasure users derive from the process (Zwick, et. al., 180). The fact that 
participation is voluntary, or perhaps even pleasurable, makes it all the more 
ideological in the first instance. We can draw a parallel here with the context of 
participatory art, as Bishop remarks, wherein the increased activation and agency of 
the audience might be seen as a heroic narrative of empowerment, it could also be 
read as an “ever-increasing voluntary subordination to the artist’s will, and of the 
commodification of human bodies in a service economy” (Bishop, 5). 
 
Similar to Žižek’s argument that active participation reinforces the consumer 
society, Zwick, Bonsu and Darmody then argue that the processes of subjection and 
social normalization within social media produce a subject that desires the very things 
needed by the system, therefore coercion of the subject becomes absolutely 
unnecessary but rather, it is social media that creates this contradiction, “making the 
user at once free and controllable, creative yet docile” (163, emphasis mine).  
 
Co-creation is not only found in social media itself but is also made possible 
by social media. This can be clearly seen in other forms of co-creation such as crowd-
sourcing, where businesses utilize the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ by getting consumers to 
participate in decision-making processes that were traditionally done by the 
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corporations. For example, Japanese automobile makers Nissan in 2012 embarked on 
what they called a social media driven, crowd-sourced campaign named ‘Project 
370Z’18, where they relied on asking the general public to specially design their 
upcoming sports car, the 2013 370Z, instead of their in-house team of designers and 
engineers. From the engine to be used, to the wheels, interiors and even the 
suspension preferred, Nissan depended entirely on their consumers to decide on 
almost every aspect of the new sports car, mainly through social media channels such 
as Facebook. Nissan specially created a Facebook page19 for the project where fans 
were able to vote and decisions were made according to how many ‘likes’ it obtained. 
The car eventually did not go on sale for reasons unspecified but was used as a 
performance car for races, to satisfy the consumers. The end result was supposed to be 
a perfect, win-win situation, where consumers are happy and satisfied having 
‘collaborated’ with Nissan in a ‘democratic’ process to build a car and vice-versa, for 
car manufacturer Nissan having ‘listened’ to the feedback of their valued customers. 
However, such an interpretation would also severely obscure the fact that these 
consumers were also exploited by practically contributing labour to Nissan for free. 
Now, there even exists an online community called eYeka20, that proudly calls 
themselves the co-creation community, connecting brands to willing consumers who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Ernst, Kurt. “Nissan Unveils Its Completed Project 370Z”. Motor Authority. 8 
Aug. 2012. Web. 1 Feb 2014. & Feder, Joel. “Nissan Invites Fans to Participate in 
“Project 370Z”. Motor Authority. 9 Feb. 2012. Web. 1 Feb. 2014.  
  
19 See https://www.facebook.com/NISMOUSA !
20 See https://en.eyeka.com/. Their tagline is ‘Where people and brands create and 
market products together’. !
!!
64!
want to co-create products or offer solutions to the problems faced by corporations 
without being paid for their labour.   
 
The implications of active participation in the age of social media do not end 
at the exploitation of the consumer. Despite the lack of coercion and in spite of active 
participation, this does not necessarily mean that alienation does not exist in social 
media. In an art installation by artist Rachel Knoll entitled ‘Listen and Repeat’, it 
featured a computer reading tweets containing the phrase “nobody listens” aloud 
through a bullhorn speaker to an audience of trees in a forest in Washington21. In this 
striking social critique of social media, Knolls point is clear. As she says, “Social 
media is used to connect but concurrently serves as a disconnect from social life 
outside of the virtual world” (Lynch, n.pag.). In other words, participating in social 
media might connect users, but they are deluded by an overwhelming illusion of 
inclusion, a false consciousness that only serves to reproduce an alienating, isolating 
effect on users’ lives, be it online and offline. As Knolls installation work exemplifies, 
users generate content to engage and communicate but to whom? In partaking more 
and more often in active participation online (and essentially the illusion of 
empowerment) through the ‘revolutionary’ medium that is social media, users become 
separated from real human interaction through the physical act of being constantly 
plugged into their various technological devices from smart phones and tablets to 
laptops and desktops. In such a reality where ‘everyone’ participates and airs their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Lynch, “Listen and Repeat, An Art Installation Featuring a Computer that 
Voice Reads Tweets Aloud in a Washington Forest”. Laughing Squid. 22 Nov. 2013. 
Web. 2 Feb. 2014.  
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views, no form of mass empowerment exists; instead this reality is marred by what 
Bishop aptly terms as an “endless stream of banal egos” (Bishop, 6.). 
 
While I have pointed out that consumers are being systematically exploited by 
a seemingly benevolent system that operates on a celebratory notion of pseudo 
democracy on the surface, the later part of this thesis will further demonstrate how 
active participation in social media not only exploits, but has now become completely 
‘obscene’, and functions via a suppression of resistance, by symbolically ‘murdering’ 
not only ‘reality’ through simulation but also representation and resistance as well 
thereby embodying what Baudrillard terms the ‘Perfect Crime’.    
 
4.2 The Obscenity of Participation 
One particularly insightful concept often adopted by Baudrillard to describe 
the general condition of contemporary media is that of obscenity. In The Ecstasy of 
Communication, he writes, “Obscenity begins precisely when there is no more 
spectacle, no more scene, when everything is exposed to the harsh and inexorable 
light of information and communication” (Baudrillard, 130). In another essay, The 
Millennium, he says: 
 
“Whenever we speak of the end of history, the end of the political or the end 
of the social, what we are clearly dealing with is the end of the scene of the 
political, the end of the scene of the social, the end of the scene of history. In 
other words, in all these spheres, we are speaking of the advent of a specific 
era of obscenity. Obscenity may be characterized as the endless, unbridled 
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proliferation of the social, of the political, of information, of the economic, of 
the aesthetic, not to mention the sexual” (Jean Baudrillard, “The Millennium”, 
160) 
 
Here, Baudrillard’s employment of the term ‘obscene’ could be misunderstood as a 
mere angry rant against the contemporary state of media in general. However, we 
should understand Baudrillard’s playful use of the notion obscene not only in the rigid 
dictionary definition sense of obscenity, i.e. being morally indecent or sexually 
perverse, but more importantly, in its second, deeper level of connotative meaning, 
where he plays with the root word of scene in obscene. Originally, the word ‘scene’ 
designates the place where an event happens. When we relate this to media, the 
French term misc-en-scène, which translates to ‘the placing of the scene’, is 
particularly useful. In a setting of a film, the scene is also where the event unfolds, 
before the gaze of the camera. Hence misc-en-scène refers to any visual element that 
lies within the scene of a film production, before the presence of the camera. 
Traditionally, there has always been a clear demarcation between what is produced on 
stage, or within the scene that the camera sees and what is ‘behind-the-scene’, the 
place where the camera cannot, or perhaps by choice of the director, should not see. 
By extension, this parallels the divide between what is commonly termed the private 
sphere and public sphere, since ‘scenes’ behind-the-scene is often deemed to be secret 
and out of public view.  
 
One way to understand the term ‘obscene’ as Baudrillard uses it then, is that it 
signals a transition to the post-modern logic, where what used to be demarcated as 
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behind-the-scene, or inaccessible to the camera, is now completely exposed to the 
camera as well. Hence, everything becomes "exposed to the harsh and inexorable light 
of information and communication” and this simultaneously signals the end of any 
form of ‘scene’, since everything in reality may, at any given moment in time become 
produced as a scene, obliterating the thin line that differentiates between the public 
and private sphere. Thus, for Baudrillard, the demise of the scene likewise signifies 
the era of obscenity.  
 
The obscene, as Baudrillard explains, not only involves the end of ‘scenes’, 
but also marks a trend of several transitions, from the “drama of alienation” to “the 
ecstasy of communication” (Baudrillard, “Ecstasy of Communication”, 130), from the 
“scene and mirror” to the “screen and network” (126), from secrecy to hypervisibility 
(130), from hot to cold, excitement to fascination (131), which Douglas Kellner, in his 
discussion of Baudrillard, characterizes as the shift from modernity to post-modernity 
(Kellner, n. pag.). As Kellner explains, modernity could be defined by the rise of 
industrial capitalism and the production and commodification of goods, while 
postmodernity is characterized by the proliferation of signs of which the broadcast 
media, in particular the television, is an important constituent, since it is able to 
rapidly disseminate and reproduce images, signs and codes. 
 
During Baudrillard’s time, the phenomenon that most probably fully realized 
his notion of obscenity was the advent of reality TV, where all aspects of life were 
infiltrated and subject to the pervasive surveillance of the camera, and everything 




“Now this opposition (between private and public space) is effaced in a sort of 
obscenity where the most intimate processes of our life become the virtual 
feeding ground of the media (the Loud family in the United States, the 
innumberable slices of peasant or patriarchal life on French television).” 
(Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”, 130) 
 
Fetveit draws the link between reality TV and the French cinéma vérité movement, 
outlining the evidential function of the images used. Thus he writes, “on the face of it, 
much of today’s reality TV seems to embody aspirations both from Vertov’s Kino 
Pravda to catch life “unawares,” and from the vérité movement of the 1960s to give 
an objective view of life as it unfolds” (Fetveit, 791). Vertov’s film, Kino Pravda 
translates directly from Russian into ‘truth’ and was considered to be Vertov’s 
interpretation of seeing reality ‘as it is’, not unlike the cinéma vérité movement. 
Reality TV was therefore in a way a precession to social media. Like reality TV, the 
image in social media has already obtained and maintains an ‘objective’ reality. 
Whatever we see on different social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram forms the impression of a reality that is currently happening in ‘real-time’, 
an objective view of life as it unfolds too.  
 
In this sense, active participation on social media is in itself a form of 
obscenity, for it is designed to perpetuate a needless drive to visibility. The use of 
social networks in itself explicitly dictates this sort of obscenity, for in social media, 
you are expected to make your thoughts visible online through status updates – the 
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first thing Facebook asks you upon logging in is the question: “What’s on your 
mind?” As if that is not enough, in that same status update post, you are also 
encouraged to tag people in your post, add a location in your post, add a photo or 
video, to reveal as much information as possible to produce content and make 
yourself as visible as possible in the social media sphere. Social media becomes a 
personal digital biography, where users automatically divulge content that was once 
deemed as private. The different functions on Facebook such as the ‘like’ button, the 
‘share’ button or the ‘upload photo’ button all serve to reproduce this obscenity, for 
using these functions will effectively allow for a more visible and simultaneously 
faster spread of information. For example, a Facebook status post might not be seen 
by many people, but the use of the ‘like’ and ‘share’ button allows Facebook users to 
spread the post to their friends, since ‘liking’ and ‘sharing’ will make the post visible 
on their Facebook friends’ news feeds. Also, because each single ‘like’ or ‘share’ has 
the capability to dissipate information exponentially to a few hundred ‘friends’ 
through exposing on the news feed, it is no longer merely an issue of increased 
visibility of information, but instead information generated ad infinitum, a form of 
hypervisibility, or the endless proliferation of the ‘social’ which is essentially 
information at base. In this sense, participation in social media can likewise be 
classified as a form of obscenity, making the once invisible hypervisible.  
 
On one level, obscenity invokes the problematic of privacy and surveillance. 
Through the obliteration of the private and public sphere, making everything 
increasingly visible, naturally the right to privacy becomes threatened as the image 
reigns supremacy in its hypervisible form. It would seem that social media has already 
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naturalized Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon effect on a global level, for data is now 
being stored in a centralized location, in the servers of social media conglomerates 
like Google, Facebook and Twitter, similar to how the panopticon apparatus is also a 
centralized system, allowing for the ease of global surveillance by state authorities of 
which the recent National Security Agency scandal in the United States of America 
remains the best example. As the often quoted phrase from Michel Foucault described 
the implications of the panopticon: 
 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, 
even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should 
tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus 
should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent 
of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in 
a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (Foucault, 201) 
 
Social media like Facebook functions dangerously similar to a global panopticon, 
where there is a conscious and sustained effort to render any and all kinds of 
information visible online. More pertinently, to draw on Foucault’s analysis, it is 
precisely the introduction of a technological device or apparatus that results in an 
involuntary and unconscious effort to be more disciplined. Because of the very 
permanence in surveillance induced by the technological apparatus, the landscape of 
the prison has changed drastically resulting in the automatic functioning of power. 
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Thus, even if there is no guard standing by at the panopticon, the prisoner, by virtue 
of his physically subordinate position, would never know and thus the very presence 
of the panopticon already functions as a disciplinary tool. The same analysis could 
also be applied to the effects of obscenity in social media. Because of the permanence 
information bears online, I foresee that over time, users in the realm of social media 
will gradually become more mindful of what they post online and self-censor, 
resulting in power relations being replicated online as well, similar to the effect of the 
panopticon. The sense of perceived leaderlessness or flat power dynamics within 
social media that has been induced by the narrative of empowerment will slowly 
erode, resulting in the gradual emergence of mechanisms of privilege and power. 
 
One key reason for the drive to obscenity can be attributed to the proliferation 
of cameras thanks to the advancement in camera technologies, where every mobile 
phone now has an in-built camera. This near-ubiquity of cameras in communication 
devices that are now increasingly mobile has allowed for the proliferation of images 
that can now capture ‘reality’ at any moment in time, in what Paul Virilio has termed 
the “democratization of voyeurism on a planetary scale” (Virilio, 109). Mann 
however extols the virtues of such a phenomenon, arguing that it actually empowers 
the common people, arming them with the same tools that the state used to have, 
therefore problematizing and challenging these “technologies of control” used on 
individuals (Mann, Nolan & Wellman, 302). Thus, he terms this phenomenon 
“sousveillance”, where instead of surveillance, which he defines as organizations 
observing people, sousveillance subverts this notion by inverting the gaze of the 
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panopticon onto organizations, through people observing organizations (ibid, 332-
333).  
 
While sousveillance may be able to invert the authoritative gaze, Mann’s 
argument however overlooks the crucial implication of people observing people, or as 
Virilio puts it, voyeurism taken to the extreme. The irony lies in the fact that while 
Baudrillard contests that there is no more secrecy in the age of obscenity and it seems 
to stand true, yet if we look at it in a different way, as Virilio maintains, is it not also 
true that everyone, in the age of social media, has now become a voyeur and are 
secretly observing each other while maintaining the very act of observation as the 
secret? Similarly, in Heidegger’s words, the essence of technology is enframing 
[Gestell], which is a way of revealing, or unconcealment. Yet for Heidegger, all 
revealing also conceals, as enframing “not only conceals a former way of revealing, 
but it conceals itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e. truth, comes to 
pass”, and that is the danger of the essence of technology (Heidegger, “The Question 
Concerning Technology”, 309). 
 
One of the clearest signs of obscenity in the age of social media can be seen 
with the use of the hash tag tool (#). The use of hash tags in social media originated 
with Twitter, but was picked up by other social media platforms such as Facebook 
and Instagram as well. As Facebook explains, the use of hash tags in Facebook will 
turn a status post into a clickable link, rendering it searchable, and therefore more 
visible (obscene) to other users who might share similar tastes or traits. For example, 
if I visited a café with good coffee and decide to share this information with my 
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friends on Facebook through posting a status saying “This place has really good 
coffee,” by utilizing the hash tag to include #goodcoffee, or even to include my 
location, #Singapore, though Facebook already automatically geo-tags the location, 
other users who are not my Facebook ‘friends’, are able to see the status that I have 
posted when they search the tag #goodcoffee, even with privacy settings turned on. 
Without the hashtag, my post would not have achieved such visiblity. As seen then, 
using the hash tag adds on another layer of visibility, making it more visible than 
visible, or hypervisible as Baudrillard terms it, since the initial post is not only 
exposed to my Facebook ‘friends’, but a second layer of visibility provided by the 
hashtag allows anyone on Facebook to view that particular post.    
 
Another popular trend in Twitter involving the hash tag that demonstrates this 
form of obscenity is #followfriday, or #ff. This trend has been in existence since 2009 
and is used exclusively on Fridays, where twitter users use the abbreviation and 
hashtag to recommend other twitter users to follow, to their current Twitter followers. 
Such recommendations help to encourage Twitter users to ‘follow’ more personalities 
on Twitter, effectively generating more visibility and publicity for various 
‘interesting’ Twitter users, through actively and voluntarily participating in this trend.  
 
As such, participation in social media has already been inscribed with an 
‘obscene’ character in the Baudrillardian sense. There is a constant, active flurry of 
participation on social media as if everything that happens in the real world has to be 
captured and rendered visible on social networks, otherwise, it simply didn’t happen. 
Participation in the age of social media enforces an obscene form of visibility online. 
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That, for Baudrillard, is the violence of the image, for in the age of obscenity, 
“everything must be seen, must be visible, and the image is the site par excellence of 
this visibility” (Baudrillard, “The Violence of The Image”, n.pag). Forms of 
participation have become obscene to the point where even the same piece of 
information, is being posted by the same user on different social media channels, as if 
to say that the same status update that is being posted on Facebook is not visible 
enough, so it has to be reposted on Twitter, Instagram or other social networking sites 
as well to make sure as many people as possible see it. Such is the “order of the 
visible”, where according to Baudrillard, “there is no longer a scene of the obscene; 
there is nothing but the dilation of the visibility of all things to the point of ecstasy. 
The obscene is the end of any scene” (Baudrillard, “Fatal Strategies”, 79). Without a 
scene, this then also signifies the end of the subject, since there is no more mirror, but 














Chapter Five: The Perfect crime? The Murder of Reality and Resistance 
 
5.1 Decrypting the ‘Like’ button   
In almost all forms of social media, from Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, 
Instagram and so on, there exists a ‘like’ button, which I define as a form of 
participation in the age of social media. Different social networks might have a 
different name to label this button, for instance, it is represented with a retweet button 
in Twitter, while on Instagram it is represented with a heart icon and Facebook 
designates it with a thumbs up button and calls it a ‘like’. Across these different (-
re)presentations though, the function is quite the same, to affirm, demonstrate support 
or agreement, or just plainly to state that one likes the post. The ‘like’ button thus 
appears simple and innocuous. But the crucial question is then, why is there no 
‘dislike’ button22?  
 
Before we pursue this line of questioning, it is first necessary to digress and 
contemplate two of Baudrillard’s key concepts, simulation, and hyper-reality. 
Simulation, as Baudrillard describes, leveraging on the semiotics of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Roland Barthes again, is the “generation by models of the real without 
origin or reality” (Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra”, 2). As he elaborates, 
“simulation starts from the utopia of this principle of equivalence, from the radical 
negation of the sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Certain social media platforms such as YouTube, Reddit and Quora utilizes both the 
‘like’ and ‘dislike’ functions however here I refer to specific major social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. Also, my argument stands 
regardless of whether there is a ‘dislike’ button or not.!
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reference” (11). Here, he suggests that simulation is the reproduction of a real by 
models but the outcome of simulation, or simulacra, is that it no longer carries any 
original referent, leaving it as a pure signifier by itself. Thus, the simulacrum is not 
unreal, but “never exchanged for itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference 
or circumference” (ibid).  
 
While Baudrillard’s idea of simulation and simulacra may seem to lend itself 
very well to today’s age of digital computers, it is paramount to point out that 
simulation does not only refer to digital reproduction, for such a view would be too 
restrictive. What Baudrillard is referring to, instead, is the idea that information itself 
can be a form of simulation. Thus his theory of simulation does not just include digital 
systems of reproduction but can include any form of model that claims to represent 
the real, including Science or even Marxist theory. That is why Baudrillard, in his 
radical analysis of Marx’s critique of society, argues that: 
 
From now on political economy is the real for us, which is to say precisely that 
it is the sign’s referential, the horizon of a defunct order whose simulation 
preserves it in a ‘dialectical’ equilibrium. It is the real and therefore the 
imaginary, since here again the two formerly distinct categories have fused 
and drifted together. (Baudrillard, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, 31)  
 
Thus, the structure of Marxist discourse and its concepts including the commodity 
form and its abstraction has already become “a giant simulation model” where it has 
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become generalized to the point it becomes an ideological universalizing claim. 
(Baudrillard, “Mirror of Production”, 33) 
 
The Hyperreal then, is the result of the disappearance of the Imaginary 
through the simulation process. It is a real that is produced by the model and taken to 
be more true than reality itself, hence more real than real. Baudrillard elaborates: 
  
This imaginary of representation… disappears in the simulation whose 
operation is nuclear and genetic... it is genetic miniaturization that is the 
dimension of simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized cells, 
matrices, and memory banks, models of control – and it can be reproduced an 
indefinite number of times from these... It is no longer anything but 
operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary 
envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of 
combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere. (Baudrillard, 
“Precession of Simulacra”, 3) 
 
If we accept Baudrillard’s proposition that we live in an age of hyper-reality and 
conceive of the ‘like’ button as a simulation, the answer to the absence of the ‘dislike’ 
button becomes quite clear. The act of agreement has already become a simulacra. 
While in Manovich’s terms, a ‘like’ button might be designated as an object of 
‘representation’, Baudrillard would instead call it an object of simulation in hyper-
reality. The ‘like’ button is its “operational double”, the simulation of the real act of 
agreeing (Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra”, 4). Once the ‘like’ button is 
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clicked, not only is it reproduced indefinitely as commodity, for other users to 
consume, but is also subject to the processes of measurement and reinjected into the 
cybernetic system of communication as information or feedback to the system, to the 
panoptic gaze of the social network, for purposes of becoming information to yet 
another simulation system, so as to assist companies in their marketing schemes and 
campaigns.  
 
There is therefore no longer a need for a ‘dislike’ button for as simulacra, the 
‘like’ button sufficiently performs the function of a model. Thus, as far as the 
cybernetic system is concerned, in its binary definition, not ‘liking’ already designates 
you as in disagreement with the post. Neither ambivalence nor ambiguity is accepted 
into the cybernetic system. Both are rendered irrelevant and useless, captured as 
noise. Following the trend of positivism, both ambivalence and ambiguity, determined 
as ‘negative’ becomes eliminated, in a twisted form of purging of “noise”. It operates 
in the exact same way as one method of the social sciences, the survey. On the 
commonly used Likert scale, the instrument for quantitative surveys, the midpoint, or 
the designated neutral point, is considered useless information. For social scientists, 
this is because the data generated does not help the research finding in any way, 
serving only to highlight the irony of an ‘objective’ science, which prides itself on 
neutrality, yet denies neutrality to its object. That is why, for Baudrillard too, “science 
itself has become pure simulation23” (15).    
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Baudrillard, here, refers to the human sciences 
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In this way, the ‘like’ button corresponds similarly to George Orwell’s 
dystopian vision of the future in his novel 198424. In the novel, an entirely new 
language ‘Newspeak’ was designed by the totalitarian state so as to remove all shades 
or vagueness of meaning in an attempt to control language and deny resistance so as 
to eventually render thinking outside of the rhetoric of the state, or perhaps even the 
act of thinking itself, impossible. Thus, words with negative meaning were deemed as 
useless information and therefore axed from the official lexicon, for example, ‘bad’ 
became ‘ungood’. The aim, ironically, was rather Marxist in nature, for it was to 
control the means of production to thinking, i.e. language. Thus, by limiting language, 
thoughts about revolution and overthrowing the totalitarian regime, or what Orwell 
termed ‘thoughtcrime’ was severely restricted. Another way of interpreting this could 
be that the aim was also to universalize a single language, and hence through this 
universalizing process control meaning and thought. It is thus strikingly similar to 
how the ‘like’ button functions on social media, whose form (Marshall McLuhan’s 
conception of medium) imposes and condemns reality, or language in this case, to a 
single universal meaning, its most literal representation, if we could still call it 
representation as such. A ‘like’ button is so ontologically simple, or parsimonious. It 
reduces the need to communicate any agreement. There is no longer a need for 
expression through language, for the articulation of any form of thought has been 
replaced by the ‘like’ button, which already performs that role. It communicates 
without communication.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See Orwell, George. 1984. New York: Signet Classic, 1950. Print !
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To further elucidate this point, consider a recent court case where a federal 
court of appeal in the United States ruled that using the ‘like’ button constitutes a 
“constitutionally protected free speech and can be considered the 21st century-
equivalent of a campaign yard sign”, overturning a previous decision (Daily Mail, 
n.pag). The three-judge court said “liking a political candidate's campaign page 
communicates the users’ approval of the candidate and supports the campaign by 
associating the user with it” (ibid). Thus, if even the institution of law conflates a 
‘like’ as speech, could we still deem the ‘like’ button as a representation? The answer 
would be no, for it is only simulation. This is why Baudrillard says “There is an 
increasingly definitive lack of differentiation between image and reality which no 
longer leaves room for representation as such” (Baudrillard, “The Evil Demon of 
Images”, 27). Without space for representation to ‘play’, and because of social 
media’s capacity to obliterate difference, when representation becomes one-
dimensional, or perhaps even totalitarian, within the realm of social media, this 
perhaps also signifies the end of democracy.  
 
This then possibly becomes the closest example of hyper-reality, where the 
virtual gets conflated with the real, the sign becomes its own referent, and there is no 
longer any distinction between what is real or virtual. Reality has been seduced, to use 
Baudrillard’s vocabulary, to conform into the model that has been prescribed by the 
technological system that is social media. As Baudrillard says: 
 
“It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a 
question of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an 
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operation of deterring every real process via its operational double, a 
programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all the 
signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes.” (Baudrillard, “The 
Precession of Simulacra”, 4) 
 
The ‘like’ button does not imitate, nor duplicate and it is almost absurd to say one 
‘likes’ something on social media to disapprove or dislike, thus satire is not even 
possible. The perfect descriptive machine that is social media offers all the signs of 
the real by ‘demonstrating’ reality ‘as it is’, through the constant stream of 
information it offers in its ‘news feed’ that gives the impression that everything is 
happening in ‘real’ time. The ‘like button’ merely simulates the act of support or 
agreement and in doing so reduces it to a pale model. It is a model, like how the 
survey is also a model, and as Baudrillard says, “the model, unlike the concept, is not 
of the order of representation, but of simulation, and it is a total misunderstanding to 
apply to it the logic of a representative system” (Baudrillard, “Fatal Strategies”, 116).  
It is only information, and not meaning. It does not represent, it simulates. That is why 
for Baudrillard, “there is nothing in common between a system of meaning and a 
system of simulation” (117). In the same way, in the case of the Nissan co-creation 
campaign discussed in chapter 4.1, to proclaim that the campaign, based on the 
number of ‘likes’, is a democratic demonstration of the consumer’s will would be 
severely foolish, for it is a mere cybernetic, simplistic measure of agreement that 
inherently has no meaning. Furthermore, the campaign serves to reproduce a certain 




5.2 Death of Reality or the Murder of the Real  
All models, affirms Baudrillard, “call an end to the real” (“The Implosion of 
meaning in the media”, 81). It leads to a “death of the real” because simulation leaves 
the principle of reality “no longer intact”, he claims (“The Precession of Simulacra”, 
5). In some of his other works, he also calls this the “murder of the real” (“Violence 
of the Image”, n. pag.).  An interesting analogy to this could be found in one scene 
from an episode in the British comedy series Blackadder. Hugh Laurie, in his 
character as a foolish and ignorant Prince George, was brought to see the play ‘Julius 
Caesar’ by his manservant Blackadder, played by Rowan Atkinson. In the play, just as 
Brutus was about to stab Caesar, Prince George, despite being a spectator in the play, 
yelled, “ Look behind you Mr Caesar!” The scene is humorous because Prince 
George, being a fool, was unable to differentiate between what is real, and what is 
staged, mistaking the play for reality. It is because Prince George believed that he was 
seeing reality ‘as it is’, that the play replicated and had a one-to-one relationship with 
reality, there is no chance for a re-presentation of reality to take place, in which the 
domain of the Real lies. Thus, the Real has no time to be produced as such.  
 
Contrast this then, to a recent event, when a pseudo news article from an 
American satirical website titled The Assam Rape Festival In India Begins This Week 
went viral on social media25. It was intended as a satirical remark on the current 
situation in India, where violent rape cases have been on the rise and the state 
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25 For the original article, please see National Report, The Assam Rape Festival In 




authority has been accused of being either too slow to react or ineffective in the 
enactment of justice.  
 
The article describes a fictitious festival in the state of Assam that has been 
around since 43 BC, where as tradition during the festival, Indian man are allowed to 
rape any woman within sight and the women from that state are expected to flee to a 
safety zone outside of the town. In the article, men were portrayed as anxiously 
awaiting the commencement of the festival and were even practicing for it, in order to 
win a trophy that recognizes the winner of the festival with the most rapes. The news 
report was shared more than 89,500 times on Facebook and around 1,000 times on 
Twitter (Deka, n. pag.)26. 
 
The article provoked a viral and hostile reaction online, as social media ‘users’ 
were shocked at the audacity of Indian men. It was not the contemptible and tasteless 
humor of the article that people took offence at, but rather, they believed the article in 
spite of the absurdity of the farce, taking it for a real event that is happening. One 
comment in response to the incident was “India is always raping something. Makes 
me sick!” (ibid). Ultimately, the content of the responses do not matter. This situation 
is the exact same situation we find with Prince George, but yet rather different as 
well, for it is no longer a scene out of a comedy, but a scene in ‘reality’.  
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The question to ask then is, why are people mistaking that particular image for 
reality? Why does the image in social media have such a ‘truthful’ and ‘objective’ 
quality of reality? Does this then not reveal the ideological effects of the medium? 
Does this not also corroborate Baudrillard’s critique that in the age of simulation, one 
can no longer identify what is true and real anymore? Images in the age of social 
media can only be pronounced as images of ‘truth’, as it happens. Could we not read 
these responses as symptomatic of a ‘reality’ that is slowly disappearing and hence we 
can no longer differentiate between what is real and what is not?  
 
While the article itself looks legitimate and real because in terms of 
appearance, it possesses a similar look and feel to other articles on trusted news sites 
such as BBC or CNN, there is also an added layer of ‘objectiveness’ once it appears 
on a social media platform like Facebook. Apart from the additional celebrated 
functions of interactivity (the designer’s intentions), and visibility, i.e. a reflection of 
publicity, the system of ‘like’ buttons itself induces a sense of objectivity and 
legitimacy. Thus, when more people start to like and share the article, this 
problematically reproduces the misguided notion of legitimacy, generating a stronger 
illusion of truth and reality, as if the number of ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ correlates to how 
true that article is. Despite its ‘objective’ appearance, the fact that it is only fiction 
demonstrates Baudrillard’s point that all that remains of the simulated image is an 
‘objective’ hyper-reality, where even its ‘objectivity’ can be questioned. Thus, I argue 
that the system of ‘like’ buttons that allows for participation online not only generates 
publicity and interactivity, but is itself a form of techne that subtly introduces a 
problematic legitimizing function, in the sense of Marcuse’s technical rationality, as if 
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the strength in numbers of ‘likes’ represent a stronger argument, or a reality that is 
more ‘true’, even though it is increasingly constructed by the ‘social’.  
 
In one essay where Baudrillard investigates the status of the object and 
question its very form, the base of its objectivity, and the strategies ‘objects’ invoke to 
deceive the subject, he writes,  
 
“Everything happens entirely as if the screen itself were the cause and origin 
of the phenomena that appear there, so serious are the consequences of the 
current sophistication of the systems of “objective” capture that they have 
annihilated the very objectivity of their processes… The object, disappears on 
the horizons of science. The event, the meaning, disappears on the horizons of 
the media. (Baudrillard, “Fatal Strategies”, 113) 
 
What Baudrillard explored in the essay, was the notion of reversibility, under the 
effects of systems of simulation and a purely rational society. He argues that because 
of the excess of information, which results in total simulation generated in the form of 
models, the object becomes overanalyzed and pushed into a strategy of defiance by 
reversal. Cause then gets misunderstood as effect and what is thought to be objective 
becomes reversible and through analysis turn subjective.  
 
Baudrillard playfully terms this the Evil Genie of the Object (108), thereby 
evoking the metaphor of the Cartesian evil demon that used illusion to deceive, which 
was also alluded to in another essay, The Evil Demon of Images. Perhaps 
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Baudrillard’s point was not only to rebuke Descartes’s rational approach, but also to 
subtly illustrate that even the most rationalistic system designed to comprehend the 
object could be a mere illusion as well. Now, within the current climate of simulation, 
the very question of whether we should trust our senses or use reason becomes 
irrelevant because we no longer perceive through either of them. Instead, we perceive 
objects through our screen, through media, at a distance, thus Baudrillard, in 
agreement with Lyotard, argues that instead of a subject-object relationship, now we 
have a network-screen relationship (Baudrillard, “The Ecstasy of Communication”, 
126).  
 
As a result, Baudrillard hypothesizes that despite the creation of objective 
systems which are essentially systems of simulation to ‘capture’ the object, what 
happens instead is a disappearance of the object, not in the sense of its actual physical 
disappearance, but that the object constantly evades the individual’s (scientist’s) 
attempt to control it, as its ontological meaning constantly slips away. Similarly, 
because the event and its meaning are constantly subjected to the presence of media 
and its processes of publicity, which in itself constitute an overarching system of 
simulation, the end result, according to Baudrillard, may only be a disappearance of 
the event as well as the implosion of meaning.    
 
The Assam Rape Festival therefore functions as such an event, despite being a 
non-event, because of its fictional existence. Yet, it is also not an event in the true 
sense of the word either. On one level, it is a simulated event because it pretends to be 
a model of reality, carrying the same weight of reality as reality itself, to the point 
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where it is mistaken as real and true as more people ‘shared’ and ‘liked’ the event on 
social media, generating a momentum of ‘truth’. Hence one ideological effect of 
social media as such is precisely to produce this effect of truth, though whether it 
succeeds or not is another question altogether. The function of ‘going viral’, the term 
often adopted for any event that manages to attain widespread coverage on social 
networks, is to instill this notion of a ‘reality’ effect that is subjected to a multiplier 
effect as it spreads. 
 
  It would be almost tempting to call it a media spectacle as Debord coins it 
because the signs and images in social media have already seduced reality into a 
simulated appearance (what happens in the online sphere). Like the way Debord 
describes the Society of the Spectacle then, we consume the news article of the Assam 
Rape Festival not as a product itself; instead we consume its meaning through the 
proliferation of signs and images that are mediated via social media. For Debord, as 
Mendoza notes, the society of the Spectacle is one that reduces the world into signs 
that are being exchanged with each other and the resulting hyperbolic image becomes 
the spectacle, as basis of the “sign mediated-relationship between subject and object” 
(Mendoza, 54).  
 
But if we ask ourselves what the event really means or represents, there is no 
clear answer. Does this mean that now we no longer have the ability to discern what is 
true and what is false? Perhaps. The event that is the news of the pseudo Assam Rape 
Festival therefore seems to correspond with Baudrillard’s third hypothesis in The 
Implosion of Meaning in the Media where he asserts that though information produces 
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meaning, the technical form of information itself results in information directly 
destroying meaning and signification through neutralization (Baudrillard, “The 
Implosion of Meaning in the Media”, 79). In spite of the excessive information that 
the Assam Rape Festival parody news article produced, through the incessant sharing 
on social media networks and the various comments generated by social media users, 
it does not inherently mean nor signify anything anymore. Whose comment should be 
taken most seriously? What does the event even mean? None of the information 
produced can help answer any of these questions.  
 
5.3 Of Fools in Hyper Reality 
Žižek describes a similar effect of virtual reality. According to Žižek, virtual 
reality offers a product that is deprived of its “malignant” properties, likening it to 
products such as coffee without caffeine or beer without alcohol, hence virtual reality 
is an ‘unreal’ reality in a sense (Žižek, “Welcome to the Desert of the Real”, 10-11). 
At the same time, he argues that the result of virtualization is that it effects a 
virtualization of reality, i.e. reality is increasingly being experienced as virtual. The 
example Žižek cites in his analysis was the September 11 World Trade Centre attack. 
During the media coverage of that radical event, he argues, the image of the plane 
hitting the tower that was incessantly repeated, were in fact experienced by us as 
“jouissance in its purest” sense (12). We watched the scene as if it was unreal, virtual 
and synthetic, made for pleasure. Because of the tele-nature of the news media, 
despite carrying the broadcast from as many different angles as they possibly could, it 
did not result in a deeper and fuller understanding of what was happening on the 
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ground but instead caused a more spectacular view of the whole incident, as if it was a 
scene from a war film in the cinema.  
 
Likewise, with the case of the Assam Rape Festival, I would argue that there 
are two processes at work. It is not only the form of the medium, i.e. the presence of 
the National Report news article within social media that presents it as a fiction of 
reality, but also the obscenity of participation, or the processes of publicity itself, i.e. 
through forms of participation such as ‘sharing’ and ‘liking’ that further cements the 
news article’s position as hyper-reality. From Baudrillard’s point of view then, 
whether the news article is true or not does not even matter anymore. Instead, it is in 
the very reaction of the crowd that pronounces it as real, thereby producing it as a 
hyperreal.   
  
The simulated forms of participation within social media reproduces a 
predominately one-dimensional representation that generates a problematic portrayal 
of the Assam Rape Festival that is predominantly Eurocentric in nature, in which 
Indian men are not only viewed as but believed to be the violent and savage Other. 
Through the respective means of heightened visibility and simulated reality, both 
enabled through social media, such tenets of representation and participation, depicted 
as ‘democratic’ goods, facilitated the spread of a problematic ‘Indian’ image. This is 
further exacerbated by the accelerated spread of information through the form of the 
‘viral’, thereby naturalizing orientalist and exotic stereotypes, furthering the agenda of 
global capitalism, with the endless production and reproduction of goods and service, 
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now to include even digital prosumption, without concern or sympathy for 
problematic issues of representation.   
 
The obscenity of participation, i.e. all the sharing and liking done which 
renders the Assam news article more visible to other users in social media, generates 
and reproduces an excess of information of the same, that particular news article, in 
this cybernetic model of information reproduction. This suggests that by virtue of 
incessant repetition, it becomes more and more real, and likewise more one-
dimensional. Instead of supplanting the myth of the festival, it develops a movement 
of truth that broadcasts the same form, which spreads like a mechanical virus, 
predicting reality in advance, hence killing off the ‘real’ reality. Thus, the function of 
sharing afforded by the very ‘like’ button only serves to fashion itself as an apparatus 
of control by social media, designed to condemn reality to a single meaning.  The 
original intention of the authors, who meant to critique the rape situation in India has 
likewise been forlornly condemned to oblivion. Ironically, though social media 
platforms like Facebook are designed for users to have ‘control’ of their content or 
messages, the form that going ‘viral’ takes often involves the content being ‘out of 
control’, like in an epidemic where the virus is no longer controllable. This 
distinctively emphasizes both Marcuse’s and Heiddeger’s points about technology 
and the contradiction of control, where the more humans try to manipulate technology 
to achieve certain means, the more technology “threatens to slip from human control” 




A recent short film put together by art director Thomas Jullien powerfully 
conveys the message that the processes of simulation in the age of social media 
problematizes issues of representation through simplification27. Jullien created a film 
that ran for less than two minutes, out of 852 different pictures, taken from 852 
different Instagram users, weaving together a story that takes the spectator of the film 
on a journey from Paris to New York. He says, “Instagram is an incredible resource 
for all kinds of images. I wanted to create structure out of this chaos. The result is a 
crowd sourced short-film that shows the endless possibilities of social media” (Jullien, 
n. pag.). While Jullien’s intention was to demonstrate the wonderful possibilities that 
the new media form Instagram provides, the effect the film produced eventually 
exhibited quite the opposite: a one dimensional juxtaposition of images that all look 
very similar. Instead of a celebration of alterity and diversity then, what we see is a 
repetition of the same image taken by different people, a blueprint or Baudrillard’s 
model if you will, as if there were only one single simplistic representation of the 
Eiffel Tower. The end result is sadly a difference that is flattened into uniformed 
otherness, repeating Marcuse’s claim about society becoming one-dimensional. 
Gizmodo’s blogger Casey Chan rightly commented, “By seeing all these pictures in a 
pseudo stop animation you realize how similar all of our photos end up being. 
Nothing is original. We’re all just frames in someone’s next movie” (Chan, n. pag.) 
For in the age of social media, we have been turned into simulacra, a copy without 
any original.  
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The Lacanian definition of a fool, according to Žižek, is “somebody who 
believes in his immediate identity with himself; somebody who is not capable of a 
dialectically mediated distance towards himself”. He gives the example of a “king 
who thinks he is a king, who takes his being-a-king as his immediate property and not 
as a symbolic mandate imposed on him by a network of intersubjective relations of 
which he is a part” (Žižek, “The Sublime Object of Ideology”, 46). If we slightly 
modify Lacan’s definition of a fool, could we not say that the same refers to 
somebody who is incapable of maintaining a mediated distance from the object he 
perceives? To put it in another way, the media, through its tele-properties has 
convinced us to believe that what we ‘see’ is reality as it is. If that is so, then all 
hyperreality does through simulation, is to turn us all into fools. Therefore, as I have 
shown above, social media and its effects of simulation, through its attempt to model 
reality paradoxically results in reality having no time to be produced. This disrupts the 
cause-effect relationship, resulting in the binary of reality and fiction becoming 
increasingly unstable, producing the effect which Baudrillard calls the ‘death of the 
real’, or murder of reality, which is far from being ‘smart’ at all. 
 
5.4 The Perfect Crime: The Murder of Resistance 
The perversion of images, according to Baudrillard, lies in the logic that as 
simulation, the image “precedes and inverts the causal and logical order” of reality 
(Baudrillard, “Evil Demon of Images”, 13). The analysis of the ‘like’ button above 
perpetuates this inversion on two levels. At the first level, as social media users, we 
have been subtly invited to react and respond with the click of a button even before 
we read any posts on social media. The ‘like’ button is fixed in place in advance of 
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time, and is ever present in the first instance. As we participate in social media by 
clicking the ‘like’ button, the actual ‘real’ act of agreeing no longer needs to be 
produced. Even if it is eventually produced, it will first happen in virtual space 
produced posterior to the ‘like’ button, perpetually catching up to the anterior of the 
virtual. Hence, we see the valorization of the virtual and the symbolic murder of the 
Real as argued in the previous chapter as effects of social media. Following this 
thought, the question we could raise is: wouldn’t the very presence of the ‘like’ button 
in advance of the event itself, actually prevent the event from happening?  
 
The second level of perversion lies within the cybernetic neoliberal model of 
consumption that underpins social media: its advertising model. Once the user clicks 
the ‘like’ button in social media, it is permanently remembered by the smart system. 
In the future, similar posts will be recommended or suggested to that user because the 
system remembers every user’s preferences and categorizes each user. The 
advertising system works in the same way. Perfectly calculated, this embodies the 
technological rationality of the system that is very much the new age of advertising, 
where advertising messages that are determined by a cybernetic formula to be relevant 
to your preferences are specially crafted and ‘pushed’ to you. As Facebook 
themselves put it, “we think relevant advertising is good for your overall experience 
on Facebook”28 (Facebook, n. pag.). In other words, Facebook’s advertising operates 
via focused targeting, much like a military strike, where precision is key.  
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This means advertisers can select not only the demographics of the group they 
wish to show their advertisement to, but also the location where the users are from, 
and most importantly, the crucial distinction between advertising on older forms of 
media and social media: key words29. Thus, based on the preferences and ‘likes’ that a 
Facebook user voluntarily keys into his or her profile, the user is segmented into 
different categories, i.e. the subject is reversed and turned into an object-target for 
tailored advertising. This is also the reason why social media companies such as 
Facebook and Google30 require voluntary and active participation from their users, so 
that they are able to turn the content that is produced from their participation into 
‘feedback’, which then drives their advertising model and renders it more precise, 
accurate and targeted. Google uses a similar software called ‘Adwords’ where their 
selling point is to “bring your message to exactly the right customers wherever they 
are online” (Google, n.pag). With their contextual targeting tool, Google claims to be 
able to help advertisers target the right user in the right context.   
 
The key ideological difference between this form of advertising and previous 
forms of advertising that underpin older media is that social media now thrives on 
active and voluntary participation. At the same time, it is also precisely through this 
voluntary participation in the age of social media, the willing ‘surrender’ of personal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The video ‘How advertising works on Facebook’ demonstrates very clearly how 
their advertising model work and how one can advertise on their site. See Facebook. 
How Advertising Works on Facebook. 7 Jul. 2010. Web. 16 Dec 2013. 
<https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=10150228703690484> 
 
30 Google owns Youtube and Google plus which are social networks that fall into the 
conventional definition of social media. Also, as argued earlier, social media should 
be conceptualized more as the current state of the Internet instead of an individual 
form of networking site such as the usual culprits of Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, etc.!!
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information by the masses that drives and provides the impetus for machines to be 
increasingly smarter and increasingly more adept at predicting reality. By contributing 
more and more information through its users, social media is part of the phenomenon 
known as “Big Data”, where information collected through the surveillance of social 
media technologies have produced a conundrum for scientists because the data set are 
just too large and complex. It is getting increasingly difficult to make sense of the data 
within ‘Big Data’, or as the scientists might put it, it is harder to make the data 
meaningful anymore, as their current tools become inadequate to interpret ‘Big Data’.  
 
5.5 Deep(?) Learning 
This therefore lays the premise for more technology, i.e. more sophisticated 
and ever ‘smarter’ machines to be developed in order to take over the role of the 
scientist in interpreting data since the scientist is deemed to be too slow compared to a 
machine. In a branch of artificial intelligence called Deep Learning, software is now 
being trained to understand and decipher meaning. Through the use of complex 
algorithms to completely simulate or mimic how the human brain works in learning 
and understanding meaning, this “purer” form of artificial intelligence is now able to 
gather and react to information. With Deep Learning, the system is able to understand 
and determine what certain words or images ‘are’ without the aid of a human first pre-
labeling them or without a context. Thus, the system can now identify, ‘learn’ and 
categorize objects by itself, without any form of human intervention, unlike previous 
machine learning tools. This is done through simulating the operation of how the 
brain works when it processes a wealth of different cues from visual, auditory to 
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written cues so as to understand and respond to the environment (Hernandez, n.pag), 
and this in itself is already a problematic cybernetic illusion. 
 
Following the ‘information revolution’ then, Deep Learning can be seen as the 
next cybernetic dream – of technology replacing humans so as to produce the perfect 
condition for the “true understanding” of “meaning”. William O’Connor, a writer 
from The Daily Beast, commented on Facebook hiring the supposed ‘godfather’ of 
Deep Learning, New York University’s professor Yann LeCun, as the director of 
Facebook’s new artifical intelligence lab. He says, “In Silicon Valley—whether it is 
driverless cars, drones delivering pizza, or ratification intelligence—there’s a great 
deal of optimism about the capacity of machines to replace humans” (O’Connor, 
n.pag). As another writer, Daniela Hernandez from Wired puts it, “The big potential 
(for Deep Learning) lies in deciphering the words we post to the web — the status 
updates and the tweets and instant messages and the comments — and there’s enough 
of that to keep companies like Facebook, Google, and Yahoo busy for an awfully long 
time. The aim is to give these services the power to actually understand what their 
users are saying — without help from other humans” (Hernandez, n.pag).  
 
It is not just Facebook, but various other technology giants such as Microsoft, 
IBM, Chinese search engine giant Baidu, and Google have also started to dabble in 
the field of Deep Learning. Already, Deep Learning has helped improved voice search 
on smartphones, making the system more accurate and precise, resulting in a twenty 
five percent reduction in errors (Hof, n.pag). Technology writer Tim Simonite thus 
suggests, “Deep learning has shown potential as the basis for software that could work 
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out the emotions or events described in text even if they aren’t explicitly referenced, 
recognize objects in photos, and make sophisticated predictions about people’s likely 
future behavior”. 
 
For Facebook, besides better understanding the data collected from their users, 
the Deep Learning technology holds many uses, including improving the current 
facial recognition technology such that it helps users automatically tag their friends in 
photos uploaded to Facebook as well as enhancing advertising effectiveness on 
Facebook. However, one key use of Deep Learning that immediately stands out is 
using it to better manage and improve the news feed, the personalized list of news 
updates termed the “killer app” of Facebook (Simonite, n.pag). Currently, on average, 
a Facebook user receives about 1500 news updates, in the form of status updates from 
their Facebook ‘friends’ which includes the sharing of non-original content found on 
the Internet, photos, likes, etc. (ibid). In order to organize the news feed to make sense 
of the content for the user and not overwhelm them with unnecessary information, 
Facebook uses conventional machine learning techniques to help users filter and sift 
through the data to reduce it to about 30 to 60 news updates, through an algorithm that  
prioritizes certain updates, which Facebook will not release publicly (ibid). 
 
As Facebook users naturally start to generate more information and gain more 
friends, coupled with the increased usage not only through the website, but through 
prolonged usage on mobile interface as well, the data set grows exponentially in size. 
Since the method of Deep Learning allows for faster processing of data, with almost 
minimal human intervention in a rather strange automation of automation, it will 
!!
98!
allow Facebook to better “understand” what their users are posting, and enable the 
technology behind Facebook, i.e. the algorithm, to better select ‘news’ that Facebook 
users would find interesting. That is why for O’Conner, one of LeCun and his 
artificial intelligence research team’s immediate goal would be to further ‘optimize’ 
Facebook’s news feed using Deep Learning (O’Conner, n. pag.). As LeCun remarks, 
“if you know the users’ interests and aspirations and goals in life and things like this, 
you might be able to do a better job at picking out the right news to display” (ibid). 
 
Currently, the anxiety for Facebook, as a profit-driven corporation, is that its 
users might find the content generated on their news-feed irrelevant, uninteresting, or 
not appealing enough, thereby triggering a gradual exodus of the social networking 
site. Facebook’s effort to constantly revamp their user interface and their newsfeed 
could be seen as an attempt to curb this. In its last improvement of its news feed 
feature in March 2013, Facebook allowed their users to customize their news feed by 
seemingly giving Facebook users more ‘control’ in seeing what appears on their news 
feed (Gaudin, n.pag.). Yet, at the same time, this giving of more ‘control’ to the users, 
by allowing them to choose what they see on their news feed is itself a form of control 
by Facebook over the users, by reducing clutter and “noise” so as to achieve a 
smoother user experience on Facebook and ensuring that users continue to actively 
participate and be drawn deeper into the fantasy of producing themselves as an image 
online thereby continuing to generate the information that Facebook requires. With 
Deep Learning in the equation, Facebook wants to increase the illusive sense of 





 In other words, Deep Learning in the context of social media, operates as a 
advanced form of ‘automated’ data mining software whose basic function is to 
analyze and predict, an aim that is increasingly related to the digital humanities. 
According to Liu, the increased usage of the term data mining in the field of digital 
humanities suggests a shift from the earlier paradigm of text analysis, to a more 
sophisticated form of data analytics (Liu, 14). In fact, in the age of new media, author 
centrality analyses, author degree distribution analyses, and pattern-recognition 
analysis are increasingly being deployed as techniques for better understanding mined 
data, with Deep Learning emerging as one such advanced technique that is 
highlighted as an ultimate breakthrough. Yet, like most of the digital humanists, the 
proponents of Deep Learning completely fail to consider the cultural impact and 
significance of their project. Liu puts it, in the case of the digital humanities, there is a 
glaring lack of “adequate critical awareness of the larger social, economic, and 
cultural issues at stake” (11). For instance, what are the ethical implications of using a 
data-mining method that users are almost altogether unaware of? How does the use of 
such a form of technology threaten the agency of the user? Can language be 
problematically reduced to a simplistic notion of a code that is left to a machine to 
decrypt, devoid of a context? 
 
With the case of Deep Learning, to claim to be able to reduce all forms of oral 
or written discourse to a fixed and stable logical structure that can then be decoded, is 
nothing more than a cybernetic fantasy that is at best hubristic, repeating the fallacy of 
Shannon and Weaver’s model of communication. Such discourses are not ascribable 
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to a ‘model’ of communication because doing so would be a mere simulation that 
disregards the dynamic interaction between producers, codes, material supports and 
audiences. The meaning that is produced does not simply emerge from the two 
processes of analysis and modeling, but rather, as Halliday argues, emerges through 
cooperation (Halliday, 185). Thus, as Fiormonte argues, a discourse is a “cultural 
artifact made of syntax, semantics and above all, pragmatics, and that is why all the 
data of human culture are so hard to formalize” (Fiormonte, 72). While Fiormonte 
might argue that data of human culture might be hard to ‘formalize’, I argue that it is 
an impossible task to begin with, and any attempt to do so cybernetically would only 
impoverish language itself.  
 
It is also impossible because Deep Learning repeats the classic logocentric 
assumption – that whatever one writes on social media, that meaning can be 
abstracted, mined, retrieved and transferred from one to another, whether machine or 
human, whereas Jacques Derrida has shown in the piece, Signature Event Context31, 
how such an assumption breaks down under questioning. Drawing on Derrida’s 
argument, communication is a far more complex idea than the mere transmission of 
meaning from one subject (or object) to the other as a form of transport. Even though 
language, as communication, has to be iterable and is structurally governed by a code 
in order for it to be communicable, as Derrida shows, it is also governed by the logic 
of différance, which renders the notion of context never absolutely determinable, 
because of an “irreducible absence of intention” (18). The polemic that evolved 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 See Derrida, Jacques. “Signature Event Context.” in Limited Inc. Ed. Graff Gerald. 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1988. Print 
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between Derrida and Searle after his article was published is an apt example of the 
problematic that communication poses. Even with the presence of the signature (the 
mark of Derrida), an event (the philosophy colloquium that Derrida spoke at) and a 
context, this does not prevent Searle from misunderstanding and misrepresenting the 
ideas of Derrida. Hence, the cybernetic logo-centric notion that all forms of discourse 
online can be affixed and decoded by a machine would be nothing short of a hubristic 
fantasy. 
 
The uses of Deep Learning technique include not only the optimization of the 
news feed feature of Facebook, but most likely also include enhancing the prediction 
of a user’s overall behaviour online in order to further refine and optimize its revenue 
model, its advertising algorithm. Considering how targeted and precise the current 
neoliberal advertising model that underlie social media already is, the introduction of 
the Deep Learning technology to further automate the process can only lead to one 
logical conclusion. Social media users, under the effects of simulation and through 
their own voluntary obscene participation, are increasingly rendered complicit in what 
Baudrillard calls the ‘Perfect Crime’, that is not only the murder of reality or of the 
real through simulation, but more critically, the murder of their own agency and by 
extension, the ability to resist messages of advertising.  
  
While consumers in older media had some degree of agency to resist and 
reject messages of consumerism because of various reasons such as irrelevance or 
incompatibility of the product to the consumer, this transition to social media and this 
‘new’ system of advertising drastically diminishes the degree of agency consumers 
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once had. Thus, such a system effects another form of blindness, in that it results in 
one being no longer able to resist these messages because they are precisely what one 
wants. But what one think one wants is in effect a desire that is created, manipulated 
and determined by the capitalist system itself in the very first instance. In this circular 
loop then, resistance to consumerism is therefore rendered futile, even though 
ironically, the cybernetic system relies on a ‘voluntary’ input of information. To put it 
in another way then, in using social media, it is not the system that denies consumers 
a space for resistance but instead, it is the system that coerces consumers to deny 
themselves of their own right to resist through reducing their own agency.  
 
The use of Deep Learning in the context of social media, as I have pointed out, 
is premised on the notion of predictability. As part of a cybernetic system, it seeks to 
turn the subject or user of social media into a model through simulation, so that it is 
increasingly possible to predict what the user likes or dislike. Yet, the root of 
simulation is intrinsically tied to the violent nature of the military and war itself, in 
particular the Cold War. As Ryan Bishop points out, “Simulation is the sine qua non 
of the Cold War” (Bishop, “Baudrillard, Death, and Cold War Theory”, 48). The end 
goal of simulation, in the logic of the Cold War, is to similarly “predict human 
behaviour in a given situation”, so that “events can be modeled ahead of time, 
predicated, and therefore, if desired, brought to fruition or terminated” (49). Also, 
only with the aid of simulation, a pre-emptive strike, the “essential dimension of the 
Cold War”, could be launched and justified (ibid). Thus, according to Bishop, 
simulation seeks to “reduce and absorb” all that is singular and irreducible (62). The 
same then applies with the introduction of Deep Learning, and the proliferation of 
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other similar modeling and analytic software. The obsession of predicting ‘reality’, 
especially in the case of social media, has culminated to the point where anything that 
tries to impede this form of simulation is either “co-opted or obliterated” (64).  
 
When we use more of social media then, we are drawing closer to what 
Baudrillard terms Integral Reality, the illusion of an objective reality where 
everything has become calculated and predicted, and hence a reality that is no longer 
‘real’, evoking another profound paradox where the cybernetic attempt to (re)model 
reality on social media, to make it look ‘real’, results in a reality that is less and less 
real. Baudrillard writes, “Integral Reality is the perpetrating on the world of an 
unlimited operational project where everything becomes real, everything becomes 
visible and transparent, everything is ‘liberated’, everything comes to fruition and has 
a meaning” (Baudrillard, “Intelligence of Evil”, 17). It is here that we should be 
reminded, as Lyotard cautioned: 
 
Complete information means neutralizing more events. What is already known 
cannot, in principle, be experienced as an event. Consequently, if one wants to 
control a process, the best way of doing so is to subordinate the present to 
what is (still) called the ‘future’, since in these conditions the ‘future’ will be 
completely predetermined and the present itself will cease opening onto an 
uncertain and contingent ‘afterwards’. (Lyotard, 65) 
 
More problematically though, it is the very ideological nature of voluntary 
participation in the age of social media, that has become so obscene that it has 
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transformed us into ‘inhuman’ machines that automatically and continuously feed the 
technology that is social media, information such as our thoughts, through ‘active 
participation’, reducing everything into machinic bits of information to be spread like 
capital. If the trend towards active participation in social media continues unabatedly 
without slowing down to think through and reconsider critical questions of 
participation, then the ‘perfect crime’, the murder of both reality and resistance would 




















Chapter Six.  Death, or the End to come [l’avenir] 
 
Baudrillard, in a passage from In the shadow of the Silent Majority, raises two 
hypothesis concerning the ‘social’. In the first hypothesis, he suggests that the ‘social’ 
has never really existed (71). In the second hypothesis, he suggests: 
 
The social has really existed, it exists even more and more, it invests 
everything, it alone exists. Far from being volatilized, it is the social which 
triumphs; the reality of the social is imposed everywhere. But, contrary to the 
antiquated idea which makes the social into an objective progress of mankind, 
everything which escapes it being only residue, it is possible to envisage that 
the social itself is only residue, and that, if it has triumphed in the real, it is 
precisely as such. Litter piling up from the symbolic order as it blows around, 
it is the social as remainder which as assumed real force and which is soon to 
be universal. Here is a more subtle form of death. (Baudrillard, “In the shadow 
of the silent majority”, 72) 
 
In this sense, he introduces the element of death associated with the ‘social’, a theme 
which this thesis draws upon as well.  For Baudrillard, “it can no longer be said that 
the social is dying, since it is already the accumulation of death.” As he elaborates: 
“In effect we are in a civilization of the supersocial, and simultaneously in a 
civilization of non-degradable, indestructible residue, piling up as the social spreads” 
(Baudrillard, “In the shadow of the silent majority”, 73). Social media, likewise, is an 




Throughout this thesis, I have sought to draw attention to the way in which 
much of the discourse on social media has been focused solely on the instrumental 
‘uses’ of social media. In doing so, we risk becoming ‘blind’, in Heideggerian terms, 
to the pronounced effects of using social media. The dominance of such a form of 
thinking, as I have demonstrated, is intrinsically tied to cybernetics and its underlying 
logic, which coincides with what Heidegger called ‘the end of philosophy’, where 
language gets transformed “into an exchange of news and the arts become regulated-
regulating instruments of information” (Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking”, 376).  
 
Social media, examined from a historical perspective, is an extension of 
cybernetic logic, for in a way, it seeks to replicate and simulate ‘reality’ as it is, but 
through a reductionist logic that (re)structures reality as an object of technical control, 
of which this sense of control is at best, an illusion. Far from this being an ‘objective 
progress of mankind’, this continued development towards the logic of principles of 
efficiency, performance and control effectively render us increasingly “inhuman” and 
therefore ironically anti-social instead (Lyotard, “The Inhuman: Reflections on 
Time”).  
 
As elaborated in the introduction of this thesis, social media in a way functions 




“A technological fetish is at work when one disavows the lack or fundamental 
antagonism forever rupturing (yet producing) the social by advocating a 
particular technological fix. The “fix” lets us think that all we need is to 
universalize a particular technology, and then we will have a democratic or 
reconciled social order.” (Dean, “Communicative Capitalism: Circulation and 
the Foreclosure of Politics”, 63) 
 
Social media becomes this particular fix, whether for the dream of a democratic social 
order, or for the fantasy of a perfect form of communication. Facebook’s founder 
Mark Zuckerberg repeats this claim, and recently outlined his next ‘global social’ 
quest under the Internet.org project32, where he aims to universalize Internet access. 
He proposed that through connecting the entire globe, the problem of global economic 
disparity could be resolved, claiming connectivity as an essential “human right” and 
efficiency as key to helping businesses drive internet access (Zuckerberg, n. pag.). 
Through his rhetoric, social media becomes fulfilled as the ultimate technological 
fetish, the ‘fix’ that needs to be applied, the panacea to a troublesome affliction. Yet 
what is being occluded is that this in itself is already a form of simulation, for the 
technological ‘fix’ becomes a model that is extrapolated, that claims to be universal 
and problematically reproduced and applied for any scenario. Again, because the 
romanticized emphasis is on how social media, or what Zuckerberg terms 
‘connectivity’, can supposedly be used appropriately to eradicate injustice, we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The Internet.org project is a project spearheaded by Facebook founder Mark 
Zuckerberg which include major technology and communication corporations such!as 
Nokia and Samsung, that aspires to connect the world through providing Internet 
access to every single person on Earth. See www.internet.org for more details. 
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become somewhat blind to the notion that economic disparity is in effect a structural 
problem that exists within neoliberal capitalism today and it is a problem that will 
continue to persist even with the ‘cure’ prescribed by Zuckerberg. Zuckerberg’s claim 
is a perfect example of how new media technology such as the Internet, or social 
media becomes problematically mythologized as the tool for emancipation, that 
engenders freedom, liberation and the empowerment of the individual.  
  
As I have discussed in chapter 3.1 as well as in chapter 5.1, the ideological 
transition that social media promises, the transition from a consumer to a producer, or 
the process of prosumption, has been wrongfully conflated with the idea of 
emancipation and liberation. The reversibility of the consumer to a producer that is 
contingent on the active participation of the prosumer does not produce a strategy of 
revolution because the fundamental structure of the political economy of 
communication that underpins the media remains the same (Baudrillard, “Requiem 
for the Media”, 182).  Although social media is increasingly seen as a site of 
resistance, allowing for new subjectivities to be formed as well as a space for 
challenging dominant ideologies or systems of power, precisely because 
communication through social media is simulation in a Baudrillardian sense, the 
converse is also true as I have argued, for through simulated forms of participation in 
the age of social media, representation is symbolically being ‘killed off’, and 
resistance threatened through the erasure of the user’s agency.  
 
Even though active participation at the theoretical level is often seen as a 
strategy of resistance or a form of enacting agency, particularly in the domain of art 
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and film as discussed in chapter three, I have argued, through examples such as the 
‘like’ button, the fictitious ‘Assam Rape Festival’ and the Deep Learning technology, 
that active participation in the age of social media no longer functions as a strategy of 
resistance against passivity, but rather sutures the user into a deeper illusion of pseudo 
activity, or what Žižek calls “inter-passivity” (Žižek, “The Obscene Knot of Ideology 
and How to Untie It”, 342), where in the first instance, it is entirely impossible to be 
passive in social media because as social media users, we are always constructed, or 
implicated as an ‘active’ user in the first instance.  
 
More problematically, active participation in the age of social media has 
become voluntarily ‘obscene’, in the Baudrillardian sense, where there no longer 
remains a proper ‘scene’ for representation, where everything becomes (hyper)visible 
and completely exposed to the world. This, for Baudrillard, was a form of violence of 
the image as well as information, and we have moved from the stage of the scene and 
mirror, to the screen and network (Baudrillard, “Ecstasy of Communication”, 130). 
As Kevin Robins notes in his analysis of the representation of the Gulf War, “The 
screen exposes the ordinary viewer to harsh realities, but it screens out the harshness 
of those realities. It has a certain moral weightlessness: It grants sensation without 
demanding responsibility, and it involves us in a spectacle without engaging us in the 
complexity of its reality” (Robins, 80). The screen only offers a simple reality, and in 
doing so, engenders what Baudrillard called the murder of the ‘real’. 
 
The obscenity of participation in social media, aided and encouraged by the 
technical forms of mediated participation such as the ‘like’ or ‘share’ button, results in 
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the generation of an excess of information, and rather than this generating a form of 
communication that is more meaningful, the opposite is true, for meaning “exhausts 
itself in the act of staging communication.” (Baudrillard, “The Implosion of Meaning 
in the Media”, 80). In the end, with communication via social media, i.e. increasingly 
mediated or simulated participation online, the “imaginary of representation starts to 
disappear” (Baudrillard, “Precession of Simulacra”, 3), resulting in the death of 
representation because representation becomes ‘fixed’ and one-dimensional, and 
space for representation ceases to exist. More importantly, such a drastic outcome 
suggests far more troubling implications, since the incapability of social media to 
have multiple representations or even represent difference suggests that the very idea 
of democracy is being challenged through active participation in social media 
precisely because of social media’s capacity to obliterate difference as noise. 
 
The combined effect and interplay of simulation and obscenity of active 
participation in the age of social media culminates in what Baudrillard termed the 
‘Perfect Crime’. The perfect crime, is the “elimination of the real world”, which 
begins with the “elimination of the original illusion” (Baudrillard, “The Perfect 
Crime”, 61). The multiple deaths that I have described in this thesis, as a result of 
active participation in social media, i.e. the death of representation and therefore 
democracy, the death of the ‘scene’, the death of ‘reality’ as well as the death of 





“Such is the story of the perfect crime, which shows itself in the whole current 
‘operationality’ of the world, in our ways of realizing those things that are 
dreams, phantasms, utopias, transcribing them digitally, turning them into 
information, which is the work of the virtual in its most widely accepted sense. 
This is the crime: we attain a perfection in the sense of a total 
accomplishment, and that totalization is an end. There is no longer any 
destination elsewhere, nor even any ‘elsewhere’. The perfect crime destroys 
otherness, the other. It is the reign of the same. The world is identified with 
itself, identical to itself, by exclusion of any principle of otherness. 
(Baudrillard, “The Perfect Crime”, 63)  
 
Yet, the perfect crime remains in itself an impossibility. It is impossible 
because, like the reversals and paradoxes brought up thus far, the perfect crime is the 
complete paradox. For if a perfect crime has been committed, there would be “no 
criminal, no victim, and no motive”. Nobody would even realize that a crime has been 
committed. There would be absolutely no trace of anything left, but nothingness. That 
is why Baudrillard says, “Fortunately the crime is never perfect” (Baudrillard, “The 
Perfect Crime”, 7). Perhaps then, the ultimate illusion is the thought that we can do 
away with illusion itself altogether.  
 
Social media might attempt to replicate and simulate reality through 
transposing reality digitally online, mirroring the cybernetic attempt to erase, recreate 
or reproduce singularity by making everything operational and calculable but 
eventually, this attempt remains imperfect, and traces of this imperfection can be seen 
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from the various paradoxes and contradictions that social media evoke. That is why 
though social media may realize the multiple deaths of representation, reality, and 
resistance, but in the last instance, this is not a final death, but in Derrida’s words, 
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